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YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
Broken Experimentation, Sham Evidence-Based Policy
Kristen Underhill*
Evidence-based policy is gaining attention, and legislation and agency
regulation have been no exception to calls for greater uptake of research
evidence. Indeed, current interest in “moneyball for government” is part of a
long history of efforts to promote research-based decisions in government,
from the U.S. Census to cost-benefit analysis. But although evidence-based
policy-making (EBPM) is often both feasible and desirable, there are reasons
to be skeptical of the capacity of EBPM in governmental decision-making.
EBPM is itself bounded by limits on rationality, the capacity of science, the
objectivity of science, and the authority we wish to give technocrats. Where
values are highly contentious, efforts to produce and use evidence in
legislative and regulatory decisions may go so far awry that they become
“sham” versions of evidence-based choices. In this Article, I name several of
these sham practices, including the distortion of evidence, the engagement in
“terminal” experimentation that destabilizes governmental programs, and
“ratcheting” actions that defund entire priorities rather than individual
approaches. Broken experimentation is also common, with evaluations of
government programming and policies neglecting or misusing opportunities
to provide rigorous evidence. I argue that the stakes of these misuses are high,
resulting in losses of welfare and efficiency, erosion of scientific legitimacy,
and infringement on the dignity of human subjects. But where genuine
engagement with empirical evidence is possible, the game is surely worth the
candle. This Article proposes novel ways to promote responsible uses of
empirical evidence in both legislation and agency regulation, including
evaluation mandates, pre-registration of evaluation protocols and
transparency of research reports, ex ante decision commitments, and more
attentive uses of judicial review.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2012, death penalty supporters and detractors eagerly awaited the
publication of a report by the National Research Council (NRC), two years
in the writing, that sought to resolve the question of whether the penalty in
151
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fact deters homicide.1 The NRC’s prior effort to do so in 1978 had been
inconclusive, finding that existing studies “provide[d] no useful evidence on
the deterrent effect of capital punishment.” 2 In the ensuing decades,
however, a mass of new research had emerged with wildly divergent
findings, ranging from showings of extreme deterrence to the suggestion of
increased homicides where the death penalty is imposed. 3 Rancorous
disagreements flourished in both politics and the scientific literature. The
new committee would weigh this body of evidence, appraise its
methodology, and issue an updated conclusion. But when the report
emerged, researchers and policy advocates alike were bewildered. Despite
all of the intervening research, the committee had concluded that “all of the
research about deterrence and the death penalty done in the past
generation, including by some first-rank scholars at the most prestigious
universities, should be ignored.”4 Evidence, therefore, could be no guide to
state decisions on whether to retain or abolish the penalty—states were, as
they long had been, left to resolve the question primarily on the basis of
values rather than empirical evidence.
Frustration about the weight and direction of empirical evidence across
a range of issues—the deterrence effect of the death penalty,5 the extent to

*

Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I am grateful to Gillian
Metzger, Susan Sturm, Jeff Fagan, Colleen Chien, Ian Ayres, Matt Spitzer,
David Schwartz, Shari Diamond, Josh Kleinfeld, and participants at the
Northwestern Law faculty workshop for valuable feedback and
conversations that shaped this work. I am also grateful to Juliana Bennington
for excellent research assistance. All errors herein are my own.

1.

See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (Daniel S.
Nagin & John V. Pepper, eds., 2012). I am grateful to Josh Kleinfeld for
suggesting this case study.

2.

Id. at 1 (quoting the NRC report from 1978).

3.

Id. at 1; see also John J. Donohue III & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of
Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 793
(2006).

4.

Editorial Board, The Myth of Deterrence, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/28/opinion/the-myth-ofdeterrence.html [https://perma.cc/JWA9-79C5].

5.

NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1.
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which sanctions6 and walls7 deter migration, the extent to which supervised
injection facilities reduce opioid overdoses,8 to name a few—has taken
center stage because, by and large, we think evidence should matter in
legislation and agency regulation. Indeed, evidence-based policy-making
(EBPM) may be having a popular moment. EBPM refers to the systematic
use of empirical research evidence by legislators and agency personnel
when making government decisions, and it has long been the province of
policy wonks and scholars eager for research evidence to play a larger role
in decision-making. The process of EBPM entails both the generation and
use of empirical evidence at several time points, suggesting that regulators
and legislators should (1) consult past research evidence when making
policy choices, including evidence that characterizes a public problem and
the likely impacts of different policy options for solving it; (2) when making
a public policy decision, fund or allow research that will evaluate the
impacts of that decision; and (3) after evaluation results are available,
reassess and adjust their policy decisions in light of the new evidence.
In recent years, the House and Senate have both taken an interest in the
promotion of EBPM, launching a federal Commission on Evidence-Based
Policymaking to make recommendations promoting evidence-based
practices in the federal government—and, more recently, enacting those
recommendations as law early in 2019.9 These efforts come on the heels of
the Obama presidency, the most hospitable administration yet for empirical
research in federal regulation, and efforts to rebrand EBPM as “moneyball
for government” are gaining popular cache. Observers of the Trump
administration’s reshaping and retraction of Obama-era scientific
committees, rejection of “evidence-based” terminology, and efforts to
redefine “evidence” are galvanized to point out affronts to empirical

6.

See, e.g., Samuel Bazzi et al., Deterring Illegal Entry: Migrant Sanctions and
Recidivism in Border Apprehensions (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 25100, 1981), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25100
[https://perma.cc/TVV7-CKMJ].

7.

Gretchen Frazee, Trump Says Walls Work. It’s Much More Complicated, PBS
(Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/trump-says-wallswork-its-much-more-complicated [https://perma.cc/YLS7-5RGA].

8.

Elana Gordon, What’s the Evidence That Supervised Injection Sites Save Lives?,
NPR (Sept. 7, 2018, 2:40 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2018/09/07/645609248/whats-the-evidence-that-supervised-druginjection-sites-save-lives [https://perma.cc/Z2BJ-Q23Q].

9.

Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115435, 132 Stat. 5529 (2019).
153

YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW

38 : 150

2019

research. Grassroots efforts to bring data to bear on political issues are also
ubiquitous.
Against this backdrop, however, questionable uses of evidence and
evidence-based policy-making run rampant. High-quality research on
policy decisions is often absent, and evaluation mandates are unfunded or
toothless, culminating in research that is poorly designed or irrelevant to
policy choices. Some policy research is forcibly stalled—as seen in a 2017
congressional decision to bar all randomized trials of school voucher
programs after one such trial showed a lack of benefit.10 “Broken
experimentation” and a lack of rigorous policy evaluation provides evidence
that is misleading at best, depriving decision-makers and those who
implement governmental programs of the evidence needed to improve
program designs.
Pathological uses of existing research evidence are similarly ubiquitous.
In the last few years, for example, efforts to redefine evidence that may be
considered by EPA scientific committees, as well as experts eligible for input
on such committees, are reshaping the nature of the evidence considered by
the agency.11 Multiple categories of programming have been canceled based
on evaluations of individual programs within a larger group, such as the
recent revocation of after-school programming12 and teen pregnancy
prevention funds. 13 And claims to “evidence-based” authority for the

10.

Sarah D. Sparks, Congress Budget Deal Bans New Gold-Standard Studies of
Federal Vouchers, EDUC. WEEK: BLOGS (May 2, 2017, 9:44 AM),
https://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/inside-school-research/2017/05/
congress_budget_deal_bans_new.html [https://perma.cc/5Q9N-SSQK]; see
also Adam Gamoran, Evidence-Based Policy in the Real World: A Cautionary
View, 678 ANNALS AMERICAN ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. (AAPSS) 180, 185 (2018)
(describing the bar on randomized trials as “simply banish[ing] unwanted
evidence”).

11.

See infra notes 179-180 and accompanying text.

12.

Robert Gordon & Ron Haskins, The Trump Administration’s Misleading
Embrace of ‘Evidence,’ POLITICO (Mar. 31, 2017, 5:35 AM),
https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/03/the-trumpadministrations-misleading-embrace-of-evidence-000385
[https://perma.cc/JC8V-TX3Q].

13.

Alison Kodjak, Trump Administration Sued over Ending Funding of Teen
Pregnancy Programs, NPR (Feb. 15, 2018, 11:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/02/15/585879601/
trump-administration-sued-for-ending-funding-of-teen-pregnancyprograms [https://perma.cc/R2WZ-GMQR].
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promotion of initiatives with slim or contrary evidence are pervasive, so
much so that the term is easily viewed as an empty claim to authority.
One way to interpret these events is through the lens of political
economy. Evidence—including the production of information, presentation
and classification of facts, and selection of people recognized as
authorities—is one tool among many in decisions that are inevitably a
matter of political capital. Mobilization, distortion, and selective production
of evidence is to be expected. Another interpretation is as a matter of
institutional capacity; legislatures, federal agencies, and the humans who
make decisions therein are bounded in their rationality and the resources
available to produce and use research evidence. But while I do not dispute
either account, this Article offers context drawn from a longer history of
research on the capacities and limitations of evidence-based policy. The
theoretical development of EBPM stretches back decades, if not centuries,
with sophisticated models of how research evidence may be used
productively in some, but not all, government decisions. EBPM advocates
from several recent generations have been clear-eyed about the limitations
of research evidence in practice, but much of this thinking has been absent
from the discussion of “evidence-based” ideals in legal scholarship.
My goals in this Article begin with an effort to place current interest in
EBPM in context, examining the theoretical appeal and advantages of EBPM,
the limitations of evidence and its uptake in government decision-making,
and a brief history of the rise and uncertain trajectory of EBPM at the federal
level. The second aim of this work is to identify ways in which EBPM can go
wrong. Building on recent examples in “evidence-based” efforts, I develop
an original taxonomy of specific pathologies, ranging from the neglect and
deliberate undermining of research (broken experimentation), to the
distortion of evidence (a form of sham EBPM), to the disingenuous use of
selective evidence to de-fund entire program categories (ratcheting). A
third goal of this Article is to illuminate the stakes, potential costs, and
possible benefits of sham EBPM, including implications for welfare,
efficiency, scientific legitimacy, the production of knowledge, human
subjects enrolled in governmental studies, and potential positive
externalities.
Building on these arguments, my final aim herein is to propose
remedies for the current pathologies in the production and uses of evidence.
I begin, however, with a call to set a more realistic scope for the policy areas
where we might hope to introduce research evidence productively. Some
areas are more prone to EBPM pathologies than others, particularly
problems of evidence distortion, weakening scientific legitimacy, and
burdens on human subjects who enroll in research with no chance of policy
payoff. But where EBPM is possible—where regulators or legislators are
155
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supportive of efforts to use empirical evidence productively—I propose that
innovations such as ex ante policy commitments (e.g., pre-commitments
contingent on research findings), evaluation mandates, and rules for
evaluation transparency may avoid some of the pitfalls that currently
stymie EBPM.
This Article proceeds in the following Parts. Part I begins with the
merits and limits of evidence-based policy-making, a process that includes
both governmental decision-making and subsequent evaluation of those
choices. In its ideal form, EBPM improves the likelihood that governmental
actions will achieve their own ends, making it agnostic to policy preferences.
EBPM asks regulators and legislators to identify, synthesize, and interpret
the empirical evidence informing each decision; to make decisions in the
direction favored by the evidence; to evaluate the outcomes of decisions;
and to update decisions as informed by new evidence. This Part will provide
a brief overview of EBPM’s inroads into regulation and legislation.
Part II turns to ways in which EBPM can fall so far short of the ideal as
to be “sham,” with costs for both the legitimacy and the practical
consequences of government choices. I focus first on common pathologies
in governmental efforts to generate evidence (broken experimentation),
and then turn to visible pathologies in the application of evidence (sham
EBPM). Here I consider four central pathologies of sham EBPM: technical
breakdowns in the uptake of evidence, distortion of evidence, terminal or
symbolic experimentation without broader adoption of results, and
ratcheting cuts to program categories. The central concerns of this Part are
deep-seated methodological flaws in evidence generation, as well as
irreparable gaps in the feedback loops between evaluation and policy
decisions.
Part III will consider the ethics and costs of broken experimentation and
sham EBPM, including consequences for allocation of resources, the
legitimacy of science, the interests of individual human subjects, and the
communities those subjects represent. I will argue here that, despite some
positive externalities, sham EBPM can cause harm, including wasting public
resources, misleading the public, eroding scientific legitimacy, and
threatening the dignity of human subjects.
In Part IV, I seek to reclaim EBPM and governmental experimentation
by identifying conditions where program and policy evaluations are likely
to be both rigorous and effective in shaping policy. By extension, I will also
identify conditions where evidence is likely to be distorted, misleading, or
irrelevant. Evaluation should be both more and less used than it currently
is—more so in contexts where it would be effective, but perhaps less so
when there is reason to believe it will skew or contribute little to decisions.
Where regulators and legislators do build evaluation into their policy
156
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choices, they have a range of legal options to avoid sham evaluations—both
by setting explicit terms for study design, but also by taking affirmative, ex
ante, and perhaps binding steps to define how results will affect subsequent
policy choices.
I. THE CASE FOR (BOUNDED) EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY-MAKING
It may seem uncontroversial to argue that legislators and regulators
should make use of empirical research evidence in their decisions and then
evaluate the subsequent effects. Gathering information about the effects of
regulatory choices is a fundamental part of experimentalism 14 and new
governance,15 and ex post evaluations of policy decisions are essential for
updating those choices over time. Recent legislation16 and scholarship17 aim
to build momentum for uses of empirical evidence in policy-making
processes, with some renewing hopes that attentiveness to statistical
evidence may break partisan stalemates.
But debate about the proper role of empirical evidence in governmental
decision-making is wide-ranging and often contentious, replete with both
practical and normative challenges. The practice and promotion of EBPM
was accelerated by the UK Labour Party’s commitment to “what works,”18
the growing embrace of EBPM in US federal agencies, and the academic rise
of “evidence-based” terminology in the 1990s. Like evidence-based practice
movements in other fields,19 EBPM has adopted many principles of
evidence-based medicine: “the conscientious, explicit and judicious use of
14.

See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).

15.

See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004);
Victoria F. Nourse & Gregory C. Shaffer, Empiricism, Experimentalism, and
Conditional Theory, 67 SMU L. REV. 141 (2014).

16.

COMM’N ON EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING, THE PROMISE OF EVIDENCE–BASED
POLICY MAKING (2017).

17.

EVIDENCE-BASED SOCIAL POLICY: THE PROMISE AND CHALLENGES OF A MOVEMENT, 678
ANNALS AAPSS 1 (Ron Haskins ed., 2018).

18.

KATHERINE SMITH, BEYOND EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY IN PUBLIC HEALTH 11–13
(2013).

19.

See LIZ TRINDER & SHIRLEY REYNOLDS, EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE: A CRITICAL
REAPPRAISAL (2000) (canvassing the diffusion of evidence-based medicine
principles through medical and nursing practice, public health, education,
social work, criminal justice, and other areas).
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current best evidence in making decisions,”20 with priority given to
evidence from methodologically rigorous research designs. 21 Translated to
legislation and regulation, EBPM asks decisions-makers to identify and use
empirical evidence when making choices, to weigh evidence according to
methodological quality, to evaluate the impacts of those decisions, and to
modify choices that do not work as planned.
This Part will consider the case for using and generating empirical
evidence through policy choices, followed by some of the reasons why
actual policy development inevitably diverges from the technocratic ideal.
“Bounded” EBPM notwithstanding these limitations, however, is both
desirable and feasible. Even if policy based entirely on “what works” is
elusive, there is ample room for using empirical data in both legislation and
regulation once the goals of those policy choices are defined. This Part will
then consider past and recent efforts to promote EBPM in practice.22
A. Judging Decisions by Their Own Lights
Evidence-based policy-making, in short, is the use of empirical research
findings to inform policy choices.23 In 2016-2017, Congress convened the
federal Commission on Evidence-Based Policymaking to issue
20.

David L. Sackett et al., Commission on Evidence-Based Policy-Making, 312
BRIT. MED. J. 71 (1996). For a retrospective review of the evidence-based
medicine movement, see Trisha Greenhalgh et al., Evidence-Based Medicine:
A Movement in Crisis?, 348 BRIT. MED. J. g3725 (2014).

21.

Gordan H. Guyatt et al., Users’ Guides to the Medical Literature, 284 JAMA
1290, 1292-1293 (2000) (providing a “hierarchy of strength of evidence for
treatment decisions” based on study design and recommending that
physicians “look for the highest available evidence from the hierarchy” when
making decisions).

22.

For simplicity, this account glosses over differences between different
categories of “policy-makers” (legislators, agency appointees, career civil
servants, etc.), different categories of “policy” itself (legislation, agency rules,
guidance documents, informal practices, programmatic choices, etc.), and
different subject areas (health care, education, etc.). I readily recognize,
however, that the capacity and boundaries of EBPM will be contextdependent, and that some areas and policy choices are more amenable to
uses of empirical evidence.

23.

PAUL CAIRNEY, THE POLITICS OF EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY MAKING 2 (2016); Ron
Haskins, Evidence-Based Policy: The Movement, the Goals, the Promise, 678
ANNALS AAPSS 8 (2018); Brian Head, Reconsidering Evidence-Based Policy:
Key Issues and Challenges, 29 POL’Y & SOC’Y 77, 84 (2010).
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recommendations for supporting evidence-based practice in federal policymaking.24 The Commission describes EBPM as follows:
The Commission envisions a future in which rigorous evidence is
created efficiently, as a routine part of government operations, and
used to construct effective public policy . . . . “[E]vidence” . . . refer[s]
to evidence produced by “statistical activities” with a “statistical
purpose” that is potentially useful when evaluating government
programs and policies . . . . The Commission defines evidence-based
policymaking as the application of evidence to inform decisions in
government.25
EBPM asks policy-makers to engage continuously with past research
evidence, as well as to support the creation of new, up-to-date empirical
research findings that will inform subsequent policy decisions. To clarify
these dynamics, we might follow the cycle beginning with the desire to
intervene in a public problem, such as opioid overdose deaths. Legislators
and regulators engaging in EBPM would ask research questions of
governmental and nongovernmental researchers, focusing on the problem
and possible solutions. Many forms of evidence and research methodologies
are useful at this stage, and evidence should be fit for purpose. 26 In this
example, epidemiological methods could provide information about the
current extent, distribution, and potential causes of overdose deaths.
Qualitative methods can explore behavioral choices and unanticipated
contextual factors that may affect the feasibility of policy solutions.
Randomized trials, cohort studies, or methods such as difference-indifference comparisons or regression discontinuity designs could help to
identify the impacts of prior efforts to minimize overdose deaths (e.g.,
expansions of medication-assisted treatment, prescription limits,
establishment of supervised injection facilities). Feasibility studies can
identify whether particular policy choices are likely to be acceptable in the
current context.
With evidence assembled, policy-makers engaging in EBPM would then
review the methodology and strength of findings (or delegate the task to
others). At this stage, decision-makers are primarily consumers of evidence
that was gathered in past studies or generated immediately in the current
24.

Evidence-Based Policymaking Commission Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-140,
130 Stat. 317 (2016).

25.

COMM’N ON EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING, supra note 16, at 8, 11.

26.

Head, supra note 23, at 79, 84 (noting “the need to incorporate a wide range
of methodologies and forms of knowledge” in evidence-based practice).
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context. Decision-makers then make choices that integrate evidence with
other considerations, such as legal constraints, concerns about autonomy or
dignity, and the availability of resources.
Once decisions are made, policy-makers’ role in EBPM shifts from
consumer to generator (or perhaps patron) of research evidence. Decisionmakers committed to EBPM either allow or provide for robust research that
evaluates the public impacts of the policies they have put in place. For
example, state regulators may choose to impose prescription limits on
opioids and then mandate and fund an independent evaluation of how the
rule affects overdose deaths over time. The rigor of program evaluations
might benefit from implementation choices, such as rolling out a policy in
stages or randomizing geographic regions to treatment or control. Ideally,
policy-makers would fund these evaluations as part of implementation, but
it serves similar ends to partner with outside researchers and funders.
As up-to-date research findings become available, the role of policymakers in EBPM shifts back from generating to consuming evidence.
Decision-makers committed to EBPM regularly review the evidence and
revisit their policy choices. Where policies have failed to serve important
ends, or where they have caused unintended harms, these decision-makers
seek to change or eliminate them. And where policies are modified, EBPM
envisions new evaluations of the modifications. EBPM thus describes a
continuing cycle of past and future research, and it considers the policymaker’s role as both consulting and generating research findings.
Although EBPM envisions a continuous cycle of research generation and
uptake, the stepwise process resonates with linear views of policy-making.
Namely, these linear views suggest that policy development is an orderly
progression including goal-setting, policy formulation and selection,
implementation, evaluation, and revisiting choices—though actual policy
development is rarely if ever so clean. 27 EBPM has a rich scholarly history,28
buttressed by numerous models of how evidence informs policy, 29 and
shows a keen awareness of how real-life decisions are likely to diverge
sharply from the ideal. But the goal of using empirical evidence to improve

27.

CAIRNEY, supra note 23, at 17–18.

28.

See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 18, at 5-6 (tracing EBPM from the 1960s onward);
Linda Courtenay Botterill & Andrew Hindmoor, Turtles All the Way Down:
Bounded Rationality in an Evidence-Based Age, 33 POL’Y RES. STUD. 376 (2011)
(describing intellectual predecessors of EBPM in the 1950s).

29.

CAIRNEY, supra note 23, at 25; SMITH, supra note 18, at 10-20 (describing
groups of theories to describe the process by which empirical evidence
enters public policy-making).
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policy outcomes continues to motivate improvements in both research
methodology and the communication of research findings. 30
The normative case for EBPM is predicated on several assumptions.
First, regulators and legislators wish to promote the welfare of the people,
and they act in good faith to achieve that goal. Efforts to improve the
“effectiveness” of government in achieving its policy goals are therefore
normatively desirable. Second, government resources are scarce, and some
choices are mutually exclusive, such that regulators cannot simultaneously
pursue all options. Third, empirical research can validly and reliably reveal
facts about the effects of past policy responses, and this evidence is useful
in predicting how current policy choices are likely to affect outcomes of
interest. Fourth, it is possible to require and learn from contemporaneous
evaluations of government choices. And finally, policy-makers are capable
of identifying and learning from empirical evidence—or at least, capable of
delegating those activities to others and acting on their recommendations.
When these assumptions hold, the case for EBPM is clear. Under
conditions of limited resources (time, funds, capacity), it is both
normatively desirable and efficient to allocate those resources to programs
and policies most likely to promote citizens’ well-being. Empirical evidence
can thus improve the impact and efficiency of governmental choices.31 The
virtues of EBPM are that it is welfare-maximizing, that it can help allocate
scarce resources efficiently, and that it is applicable regardless of the policy
end in question. It thus has appeal regardless of party affiliation—whatever

30.

One such effort is the continued improvement of methods for systematic
reviews of empirical research, which aggregate findings across many studies
and aim to communicate results in a policy-relevant way. Two international
collaborations dedicated to the production and dissemination of systematic
reviews are the Cochrane Collaboration and the Campbell Collaboration.
CAMPBELL COLLABORATION ONLINE LIBRARIES,
https://campbellcollaboration.org/library.html [https://perma.cc/NBT4WTAT]; COCHRANE LIBRARY, https://www.cochranelibrary.com
[https://perma.cc/BDA5-AYPL];.

31.

Some criticize government efficiency wholesale. For example, Becker and
Mulligan have advanced the argument that inefficient tax policy can be
preferable because it forces citizens to notice and engage with government
decisions that they may dislike. See Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan,
Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government, 46 J.L. & ECON. 293 (2003)
(noting that efficient taxes tend to promote the growth of government and
suggesting that “an improvement in the efficiency of either taxes or spending
would reduce political pressure for suppressing the growth of government”).
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the current policy goals may be, more effective pursuit of those goals is
likely to be appealing to those in power.
Where the assumptions of EBPM do not hold—such as where
government acts with invidious intent to disadvantage particular groups—
greater efficiency can amplify the harm caused by legislative and regulatory
action. Consider, for example, recent activity by the North Carolina
legislature found to disenfranchise African American voters. Before
designing new voter ID restrictions, legislators consulted data on the types
of ID that black voters were less likely to have, such as licenses issued by the
state DMV.32 As the Fourth Circuit found, the legislature then relied on these
data to tailor voter restrictions to disqualify the types of alternative ID used
by black voters, “retain[ing] only the kinds of ID that white North
Carolinians were more likely to possess.”33 The process of gerrymandering
voting districts is similarly highly data-intensive and likewise an instance of
EBPM in which legislators are motivated to collect data and to use the most
robust available evidence to secure the outcomes they prefer. But where
legislative and regulatory motives depart sharply from public well-being,
improving the efficiency of government is no longer a good in itself. The
approach of EBPM is thus an agnostic tool to promote efficiency, which is
desirable only insofar as one supports the ends of governmental action.
B. The Limits of EBPM
Commentators have long hoped that EBPM will take the political rancor
out of hard decisions, and recent calls for expanding EBPM have included
bipartisan stories of compromise advanced by a mutual appreciation for

32.

Christopher Ingraham, The “Smoking Gun” Proving North Carolina
Republicans Tried to Disenfranchise Black Voters, WASH. POST (July 29, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/07/29/thesmoking-gun-proving-north-carolina-republicans-tried-to-disenfranchiseblack-voters/?utm_term=.6e20a69cdcc1 [https://perma.cc/ZE6V-7Z4E].

33.

Id.; North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204
(4th Cir. 2016). Another illustration comes from legislative action to
disenfranchise Native American voters in North Dakota by requiring street
addresses rather than PO boxes, which took place immediately after Native
American votes contributed to the election of Democratic Senator Heitkamp
in 2012. The Supreme Court declined to bar the implementation of this law
before the November 2018 election. Brakebill v. Jaeger, 586 U.S. ___ (2018).
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empirical evidence.34 Such compromises are unlikely, however, where there
is deep-seated disagreement on what the goals of government should be.
Moreover, even when policy-makers share a goal, rationalist views of
policy-making are an imperfect match for real-world choices.35 This Section
considers four limitations that make EBPM a “bounded” rather than fullthroated practice. There are many practical barriers to EBPM, including
modifiable factors like collaborative relationships, access to research, costs
of using research, and the clarity of research findings. 36 The following
boundaries would persist, however, even after resolving these practical
barriers, and they inevitably limit legislators and agencies’ institutional
capacity to practice EBPM thoroughly.
First, bounded rationality can impede even well-meaning attempts to
use evidence effectively. Literature on irrational decision-making
abounds,37 and the decision makers in EBPM are as fallible as the rest of
us,38 particularly when making emotionally laden or moral decisions. 39 To
name a few, these errors may include overestimating the likelihood of
34.

See COMM’N ON EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING, supra note 16; JIM NUSSLE &
PETER ORSZAG, MONEYBALL FOR GOVERNMENT (2d ed. 2015); Haskins, supra note
23; John Bridgeland & Peter Orszag, Can Government Play Moneyball?,
ATLANTIC (July/Aug. 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/07/cangovernment-play-moneyball/309389 [https://perma.cc/6N3A-VJG3];
MONEYBALL FOR GOV’T, https://moneyballforgov.com
[https://perma.cc/9Q4U-JRHF].

35.

CAIRNEY, supra note 23, at 16 (noting the problems of a “linear” view of
policy-making); Gamoran, supra note 10, at 185.

36.

Kathryn Oliver et al., A Systematic Review of Barriers to and Facilitators of the
Use of Evidence by Policymakers, 14 BMC HEALTH SERVS. 2, 7 (2014).

37.

See, e.g., DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL (2008); DANIEL KAHNEMAN,
THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011); CASS SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF
GOVERNMENT (2013); RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2009); Christine
Jolls & Cass Sunstein, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1471 (1998).

38.

See S UNSTEIN, supra note 37.

39.

See generally CAIRNEY, supra note 23, at 26 (describing cognitive biases and
the reliance on heuristics in emotional and moral reasoning); SUNSTEIN, supra
note 37, at 69; Paul G. Lewis, Policy Thinking, Fast and Slow: A Social
Intuitionist Perspective on Public Policy Processes (Aug. 19, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2300479
[https://perma.cc/K4XB-XGYF].
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familiar or vividly imaginable events, regretting losses more acutely than
we value gains, generalizing to social groups from individual examples,
seeking out evidence that confirms our prior beliefs, changing our opinions
depending on the framing of choices, updating beliefs to conform with
others in our political party or social group, being stymied by ambiguity or
complexity, interpreting emotions as information, believing that
independent events are related, and believing that we will be luckier than
others. Evidence from cultural cognition goes even further, demonstrating
that we interpret the credibility of scientific research itself based on our
cultural beliefs.40 Decision-makers will also have predictable trouble
sorting through empirical evidence alongside many other sources of
information.41
Together, these biases often make it difficult or impossible to see
research findings clearly, even with the best intentions to make evidencebased choices. These dynamics may exacerbate some of the pathologies that
I will later describe, including technical breakdowns in the ability to use
evidence, the distortion of evidence, and the reliance on nonrepresentative
studies to make choices about larger programs (ratcheting). Sometimes the
distortion of evidence is deliberate and for political ends. But sometimes
even well-meaning regulators or legislators may misread, minimize, or
elevate research findings because they confirm political priors or align with
normative preferences. Moreover, even if policy debate were confined to
empirical evidence, disputes about values and norms would infuse disputes
about the selection and rigor of that evidence, with little loss of partisan
rancor.
Beyond these predictable cognitive biases, the policy environment
itself—with finite time, multiple demands for attention, many decisionmakers, and high-stakes choices—affects both rational thinking and the
capacity to receive and use nuanced information. Many decisions are made
rapidly, under conditions of uncertainty and political pressure 42—
conditions where biases reign. Decision-makers’ limited time and expertise

40.

Dan M. Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14 J. RISK RES.
147 (2010).

41.

Gamoran, supra note 10, at 185. These include past experience, personal
values, political priorities, public opinion polls, anecdotes, lobbying efforts,
and innumerable other sources of information. See also CAIRNEY, supra note
23, at 22 (noting that civil servants classify many types of information as
“evidence,” such as anecdotes, expert opinions, experiences from other
governments, and public opinion).

42.

CAIRNEY, supra note 23, at 22, 25.
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also require the simplification of evidence,43 in which relevant
methodological caveats and nuanced distinctions are lost. 44 Modern
theories of policy-making acknowledge these problems.45 In 1959, for
example, economist Charles Lindblom argued that policy-makers inevitably
“muddle through” problems that require them to make choices, and that
they often neglect better alternatives in the process.46 Newer theories
characterize policy development processes that are equally far afield from
EBPM, even when they are amenable to some influence by empirical
evidence.47
A second limitation of EBPM is the bounded ability to measure
meaningful outcomes. Some values defy statistics. The problems of
quantifying fundamental values—fairness, equality, autonomy, dignity—
have long plagued efforts to develop evidence-based approaches to
legislation and regulation. One of the steps the Obama administration took
to advance EBPM was a January 2011 Executive Order, which directed
agencies not only to engage in maximally accurate cost-benefit analysis, but
to “consider (and discuss qualitatively) values that are difficult or
impossible to quantify, including equity, human dignity, fairness, and
distributive impacts.”48 Cass Sunstein, then-head of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, describes both the ethical imperative
and practical difficulty of addressing these concerns in the analysis of
particular policies, including lifting the travel ban on HIV-positive
individuals, proposing a rule to require rear-facing cameras in cars,
strengthening EEOC regulations implementing the Americans with
Disabilities Act, and issuing a potentially costly DOJ rule to reduce prison

43.

See Botterill & Hindmoor, supra note 28.

44.

Id.

45.

CAIRNEY, supra note 23, at 25.

46.

See generally Charles Lindblom, The Science of Muddling Through, 19 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 79, 81 (1959)(describing how idealized processes of
policymaking are impossible under conditions of limited time, money, and
information).

47.

See SMITH, supra note 18, at 24–38 (describing modern theories that
incorporate political economy among ruling elites, path dependency, rational
choice theory, complexity theory, and theories of dramatic policy change).

48.

Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, § 1(c) (Jan. 18, 2011). Regulatory
impact analyses beginning in the Reagan administration also considered
fairness as part of cost-benefit analysis. ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN ET AL., COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 20–21 (4th ed. 2017).
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rape.49 Even at its ideal, EBPM gives us little purchase on these choices—to
the extent that EBPM purports to remove values-inflected debate and
redirect it to a dispassionate focus on statistical evidence, the problems of
“nonquantifiables”50 would persist. This deficiency in evidence is perhaps
always a form of technical breakdown in EBPM, but it may also contribute
to evidence distortion (e.g., by providing external reasons to accept or reject
research out of hand), ratcheting, or hesitancy to commit to long-term
implementation of an important public policy (what I will call “terminal
experimentation”).
A third inherent boundary of EBPM is limits on scientific objectivity.
Ideal EBPM is desirable in part because it promises a means of policy choice
that is dispassionate, unaffected by political concerns. But this is an
incomplete promise when scientific research itself embodies values and
preferences—scientists, too, are boundedly rational, and boundedly
objective.51 Outright attacks on scientific knowledge as socially constructed
came to a head in the 1990s “Science Wars” and subsequent debates over
“junk science.”52 Although these debates have died down, they illuminated
the ways in which scientific research often involves uncertainty and
judgment—for instance, making inferences that generalize from past
studies to current decisions53 or judgments about generalizing findings to
the nation as a whole. Researchers making such inferences will inevitably
draw on values beyond objective scientific facts. Values, too, may drive the
types of questions that scientists seek to answer,54 the causal hypotheses
they seek to test,55 and the ways in which scientists frame their proposals
and policy implications.56 Where researchers do make assumptions,

49.

SUNSTEIN, supra note 37, at 166–168.

50.

Id. at 169.

51.

Regina Nuzzo, How Scientists Fool Themselves – and How They Can Stop, 526
NATURE 182 (2015).

52.

HEATHER DOUGLAS, SCIENCE, POLICY, AND THE VALUE-FREE IDEAL 5–13 (2009)
(introducing the “Science Wars” and “junk science”).

53.

Id. at 142.

54.

SMITH, supra note 18, at 177 (noting that research tends to be closely related
to political and ideological outlook).

55.

Lawrence Gostin & Maxwell Gregg Bloche, The Politics of Public Health: A
Response to Epstein, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S170 (2003) (“Inevitably,
political, cultural, and moral influences shape the selection of targets.”).

56.

SMITH, supra note 18, at 175.
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scientific norms ask them to be explicit about their choices.57 But it is
difficult if not impossible to eradicate values entirely from evidence, and
thus from EBPM. Drawing attention to these values can provide fodder for
evidence distortion (e.g., shifting the focus from research findings to the
researchers themselves) or terminal experimentation (e.g., citing
uncertainty about research findings as a rationale for avoiding long-term
policy commitments).
A fourth ineluctable limitation stems from the recognition that
decisional processes are also a means of allocating power. Using empirical
evidence in policy-making reinforces the authority of people who produce,
interpret, and communicate that evidence,58 which runs into problems of
democratic legitimacy.59 The processes of interest group politics are
imperative for identifying distributional problems, threats to autonomy, or
threats to dignity—all of which should pose real boundaries on EBPM, even
if it means making decisions that are contrary to what empirical evaluations
would counsel. 60 On this reading, a decision that deliberately ignores
research evidence may be a technical breakdown, but it may also be a means
of responding to a constituency with meaningful interests. Some of these
interests may be nefarious. They may, for example, be rent-seeking or
lobbying concerns that do not align with the public interest. But interest
group politics are also important for identifying the needs of marginalized
populations, and a version of EBPM that closes the door on political
concerns is undesirable on democratic legitimacy grounds.
Idealized EBPM is unlikely even in the most congenial circumstances.
But bounded EBPM can nonetheless make legislative and regulatory

57.

DOUGLAS, supra note 52, at 155.

58.

This calls to mind earlier claims of cost-benefit analysis as an arrogation of
power by economists. Theodore M. Porter, The Rise of Cost-Benefit
Rationality as Solution to a Political Problem of Distrust (unpublished
manuscript), http://depts.washington.edu/econlaw/pdf/Porter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/37MK-QBY3] (citing his book, which argues against such
claims).

59.

See, e.g., Gert Biesta, Why “What Works” Won’t Work: Evidence-Based Practice
in the Democratic Deficit in Educational Research, 57 EDUC. THEORY 1 (2007)
(arguing that evidence-based practice in education policy limits
opportunities for democratic participation in decision-making).

60.

SMITH, supra note 18, at 3 (quoting Geoff Mulgan, Government, Knowledge,
and the Business of Policy-Making: The Potential and Limits of Evidence-Based
Policy, 1 EVIDENCE & POL’Y 215 (2005) (“[T]he people . . . have every right to
ignore evidence.”).
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decisions better. For many choices, there is widespread agreement on what
ends the legislature or agency should pursue, and there is a limited set of
options that are both legal and feasible. Using the evidence that exists,
where possible—despite limited rationality, measurement, objectivity of
science, and authority—can help to make those choices better than before.
C. Bounded EBPM Rising: From the Census to Moneyball
Accepting the boundaries above, “a realistic goal is to have evidence
present for consideration rather than assuming it will dominate the
decision process.”61 By those lights, bounded EBPM is gaining attention. The
following brief history of EBPM will discuss its advancement in federal
agency regulation and, more recently, in Congressional efforts to improve
the collection and aggregation of statistical data to inform legislative action.
1. Origins and Cost-Benefit Analysis
Histories of federal evidence-based policy in the U.S. differ in their
starting points. Some would date the interaction between science and policy
back to the framers’ constitutional requirement that a census of the
population be conducted every 10 years,62 along with James Madison’s
argument that census results would be useful for congressional action.63
Others trace the US origins of EBPM to the creation of the National Academy
of Sciences to provide scientific advice during the Civil War,64 or the

61.

Gamoran, supra note 10, at 185; see also CAIRNEY, supra note 23, at 75 (“[W]e
need to move away from the idea that policy is made from the top down; that
the best evidence, derived from “gold standard” methods, feeds directly into
the top, and its insights are used in a straightforward implementation
process at the bottom. If policy is a messier process involving multiple actors
and levels of government, and it seems to ‘emerge’ from the interaction
between actors and local levels, we need some way to inject evidence into
that process.”).

62.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“The actual Enumeration shall be made within three
Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within
every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law
direct.”).

63.

COMM’N ON EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING, supra note 16, at 12.

64.

DOUGLAS, supra note 52, at 25.
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National Research Council as an arm of the NAS during World War I. 65 Most
accounts of the modern EBPM movement, however, pick up during and after
World War II, with landmark actions such as President Roosevelt’s 1939
charge to the Bureau of the Budget to “promote the improvement . . . of
Federal and other statistical services,”66 the Food and Drug
Administration’s new requirements for randomized, placebo-controlled
drug trials in 1962, 67 and the establishment of new administrative
infrastructure for scientific advising68 and statistical data collection.69 The
1960s and 1970s saw further developments including the provisions for
mandatory evaluations of governmental programming in the Departments
of Education, Health and Human Services, and Labor,70 the creation of
advisory bodies such as Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation in
HHS,71 the academic recognition and expansion of randomized trials for
studying social programming,72 and President Nixon’s reshaping of the
Bureau of the Budget as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in

65.

Id. at 26; History, NAT’L ACAD. SCI., http://www.nasonline.org/aboutnas/history/archives/milestones-in-NAS-history/organization-of-thenrc.html [https://perma.cc/L6HG-EDEU].

66.

COMM’N ON EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING, supra note 16, at 12–13.

67.

Jon Baron, A Brief History of Evidence-Based Policy, 678 ANNALS AAPSS 40,
42 (2018).

68.

These included National Defense Research Committee and the Office of
Scientific Research and Development. DOUGLAS, supra note 52, at 30–32. This
time also saw the establishment of the Council of Economic Advisers in 1946
and the Office of Science and Technology Policy in 1976. COUNCIL ECON.
ADVISERS, https://www.whitehouse.gov/cea [https://perma.cc/KYU3-T4P4];
OFFICE SCI. TECH. POLICY, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp
[https://perma.cc/F72Q-VUSH].

69.

E.g., Federal Records Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 81-754, 64. Stat. 578 (1950)
(codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq.) (allocating authority for review of data
collection in government).

70.

Rebecca A. Maynard, The Role of Federal Agencies in Creating and
Administering Evidence-based Policies, 678 ANNALS AAPSS 134, 134 (2018);
Larry L. Orr, The Role of Evaluation in Building Evidence-Base Policy, 678
ANNALS AAPSS 51, 52–54 (2018).

71.

OFFICE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, https://aspe.hhs.gov
[https://perma.cc/W7MN-X9PS].

72.

Baron, supra note 67, at 43-44; Head, supra note 23, at 78.
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197073—the office that would later “quarterback” evidence-based practice
in federal administration.74
Efforts to integrate empirical evidence in federal policy, however, owe
most to the 1980s-era entrenchment of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and
regulatory impact statements throughout the executive branch. Although
the federal government had tested CBA in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
in the 1930s,75 the practice was not mandated until President Reagan’s
executive order in 1981, which required a regulatory impact analysis for all
“major rules.”76 Analyses had to consider potential benefits,77 potential
costs, net benefits, alternative approaches, and legal constraints.78
President Clinton followed with a parallel executive order in 1993,79 and
CBA has since become a routine part of agency decision-making.80 CBA is
not in itself evidence-based practice—that is, regulatory impact analyses
are not necessarily used to drive policy choices. But both presidential
administrations also took steps to require EBPM where possible. Reagan
tasked the newly created OIRA with the oversight of federal regulation,
including the requirement that regulatory action should not proceed
“unless the potential benefits . . . outweigh the potential cost to society.”81
Surely regulators had always believed that their actions were likelier than
not to benefit society. But with CBA, there was a structure requiring them
to examine available evidence before reaching that conclusion.
The uses of rigorous study designs to evaluate policy and programmatic
choices also expanded greatly in the 1970s and 1980s, with landmark
73.

Exec. Order No. 11541, 35 Fed. Reg. 10737 (July 1, 1970).

74.

Kathy Stack, The Office of Management and Budget: the Quarterback of
Evidence-Based Policy the Federal Government, 678 ANNALS AAPSS 112
(2018). An important step in this development was the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1980, which accorded OMB authority to develop and
coordinate statistical activities across the federal government. COMM’N ON
EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING, supra note 16, at 14.

75.

BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 48, at 20-21.

76.

Id. at 21 (citing Executive Order 12291).

77.

Agencies were directed to consider not only financial benefits, but also “any
beneficial effects that cannot be quantified in monetary terms.” Id.

78.

Exec. Order No. 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (Feb. 17, 1981).

79.

Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993).

80.

BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 48, at 21; see Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner,
Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 167 (1999).

81.

Exec. Order No. 12291, supra note 78; see SUNSTEIN, supra note 37, at 2.
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government-sponsored studies such as the RAND Health Insurance
Experiment funded by HHS (then known as the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare),82 a set of DOL-led studies on bonuses for jobseekers who obtained employment before the conclusion of their
unemployment benefits,83 the completion of evaluations of negative income
tax (income maintenance programs),84 and the welfare-to-work
experiments of the 1980s.85
2. The Modern Era
Outside the U.S., EBPM received a public boost in 1997 when the New
Labour party swept the UK polls, bringing its “what works” manifesto to the
parliamentary majority and prime minister’s seat. 86 Stateside, “evidencebased practice” and “EBPM” gained recognition throughout the 1990s, as
did efforts to evaluate government performance.
One such effort was the Government Performance and Results Act of
1993 (the GPRA, later updated in 2010), by which Congress directed
agencies to establish goals and report on their performance.87 Federal
efforts identifying effective programs emerged in the 1990s and 2000s,
including the What Works Clearinghouse in the Education Department,88
the National Commission on Families in HHS, 89 and the listings of EvidenceBased Interventions at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.90
Agencies established new research and advisory units, such as the Institute
82.

RAND’s Health Insurance Experiment (HIE), RAND CORP.,
https://www.rand.org/health/projects/hie.html [https://perma.cc/7LVXTDHJ].

83.

GREENBERG ET AL., SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION AND PUBLIC POLICYMAKING 166-169
(2003).

84.

Id. at 111–164 (describing a series of studies that took place during 1968–
1980).

85.

Id. at 211–269 (noting that the findings were largely neglected in PRWORA).

86.

SMITH, supra note 18, at 11–12; Botterill & Hindmoor, supra note 28, at 369.

87.

COMM’N ON EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING, supra note 16, at 14–15.

88.

Maynard, supra note 70, at 137.

89.

Id.

90.

Compendium of Evidence-Based Interventions and Best Practices for HIV
Prevention, CTR. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/
research/interventionresearch/compendium/index.html
[https://perma.cc/B9YW-KZQN].
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of Education Sciences in the Education Department. 91 The 1980s and 1990s
also saw an increase in randomized trials to evaluate experimental welfare
programs, inspired in part by a series of welfare-to-work trials carried out
by Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation in the early 1980s. 92 In
the Family Support Act of 1988, Congress required randomized evaluations
of experimental AFDC welfare programming carried out by states.93
Notably, these trials embedded random assignment of welfare beneficiaries
into ordinary operations carried out by state agencies, rather than
evaluating bespoke programs intended for scientific study. 94 The 1990s also
saw randomized trials of other policy interventions aimed at poverty
reduction, such as the Moving to Opportunity housing study sponsored by
HUD and approved by Congress in 1992.95
Agency efforts to integrate empirical evidence into decision-making
expanded further under President George W. Bush. The President’s
Management Agenda released by OMB in 2001 emphasized “resultsoriented” government, culminating in the Program Assessment Rating Tool
(PART) announced in 2002. 96 Under the PART initiative, OMB directed
agencies to evaluate all programming once per five years using a survey
instrument, and further, noted that randomized controlled trials were
preferred wherever feasible.97 Over five years, OMB used the PART survey
instrument to assess federal programs constituting ninety-eight percent of

91.

INST. EDUC. SCI., https://ies.ed.gov [https://perma.cc/UGZ5-4PNN].

92.

Baron, supra note 67, at 43; Carol Harvey et al., Evaluating Welfare Reform
Waivers Under Section 1115, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 165, 175 (2000).

93.

Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 487(BXi)(iii), 102 Stat.
2343, 2380 (Oct. 13, 1988) (“A demonstration project conducted under this
subparagraph shall use experimental and control groups that are composed
of a random sample of participants in the program . . . .”); Baron, supra note
67, at 44.

94.

Baron, supra note 67, at 44; Harvey et al., supra note 92, at 172.

95.

A Summary Overview of Moving to Opportunity: A Random Assignment
Housing Mobility Study in Five U.S. Cities, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH,
http://www.nber.org/mtopublic/MTO%20Overview%20Summary.pdf (last
visited Dec. 21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/BX2H-MHY8].

96.

RON HASKINS & JON BARON, BUILDING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN POLICY AND
EVIDENCE: THE OBAMA EVIDENCE-BASED INITIATIVES 8 (2011); Orr, supra note 70,
at 55.

97.

Orr, supra note 70, at 55.
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the federal budget.98 The PART initiative was not uncontroversial; although
PART ratings were not exclusively determinative of funding, 99 many
Democrats and agency staff interpreted the assessment tool as laying the
groundwork for Republican budget cuts to social programming.100
Subsequent analyses have found that PART scores were significantly
correlated with Bush’s proposed budget, but that the scores did not appear
to influence Congressional appropriations. 101 The tool itself was
discontinued by President Obama.102 But in its place, the Obama
administration instituted a new set of agency evaluation practices, including
with OMB instructions that agencies should support budget requests with
randomized controlled trials where available.103
Several detailed accounts have outlined the robust expansion of EBPM
under the Obama presidency, the administration most aligned with the
modern evidence-based practice movement.104 As Ron Haskins and Jon
Baron wrote in 2011, “The Obama administration . . . created a sweeping
new opportunity for rigorous evidence to influence policy. No president . . .
[has] ever been so intent on using evidence to shape decisions about the
funding of social programs.”105 During the Obama years, OMB and OIRA took
98.

Donald P. Moynihan, Advancing the Empirical Study of Performance
Management: What We Learned from the Program Assessment Rating Tool 6
(La Follette Sch. Working Paper No. 2013-003),
http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/images/publications/workingpapers/moyni
han2013-003.pdf [https://perma.cc/MMB4-G67Z].

99.

Id. at 9.

100. See, e.g., Stack, supra note 74, at 115-120.
101. Moynihan, supra note 98, at 9.
102. Patrick Lester, Managing Toward Evidence: State-Level Evidence-Based
Policymaking and the Results First Initiative, 678 ANNALS AAPSS, 93, 97
(2018); see also Moynihan, supra note 98, at 6 (“The Obama administration
characterized the tool as ineffective at generating true performance
information.”).
103. Orr, supra note 70, at 55.
104. See, e.g., HASKINS & BARON, supra note 96; RON HASKINS & GREG MARGOLIS, SHOW
ME THE EVIDENCE: OBAMA’S FIGHT FOR RIGOR AND RESULTS IN SOCIAL POLICY (2014);
SUNSTEIN, supra note 37; William J. Congdon & Maya Shankar, The Role of
Behavioral Economics in Evidence-Based Policymaking, 678 ANNALS AAPSS
81 (2018); Stack, supra note 74.
105. Ron Haskins & Jon Baron, Building the Connection between Policy and
Evidence: The Obama Evidence-Based Initiatives 6-7 (2011),
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central roles in applying scientific evidence and prioritizing agency
performance, led respectively by Peter Orszag and Sunstein. 106 In 2011,
Obama’s executive order “Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review”
emphasized that policy must be “based on the best available science,” and
“must measure, and seek to improve, the actual results of regulatory
experiments.”107 The order mandated retrospective review of existing
rules108 and directed agencies to “ensure the objectivity of any scientific and
technological information and processes used to support the agency’s
regulatory actions.”109 Another executive order directed agencies to
incorporate and test their applications of insights from the field of
behavioral economics, and established the Social and Behavioral Sciences
Team to summarize agency progress toward this goal. 110
Congress also developed a greater interest in EBPM during these years,
establishing a large number of pilot programs and demonstration projects
with evaluation mandates attached, such as the No Child Left Behind Act of
2001 (an early example that prioritized randomized trials 111); the
Affordable Care Act of 2010; the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act
of 2014; the Agricultural Act of 2014; the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015; and
the Every Student Succeeds Act in 2015. 112 In 2016, Congress authorized the
Commission on Evidence-Based Policymaking to explore opportunities for

http://coalition4evidence.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/HaskinsBaron-paper-on-fed-evid-based-initiatives-2011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SX49-KLAH].
106. See S UNSTEIN, supra note 37 (describing the role of OIRA); Stack, supra note
74 (describing the leadership of OMB in advancing EBPM in the Obama
administration).
107. Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
108. Id. at 3822.
109. Id.
110. Exec. Order No. 13707, 3 C.F.R. 13707 (Sept. 15, 2015). This mirrors the
Behavioral Insights Team (“Nudge Unit”) in the UK, which still operates with
UK government support. See also Congdon & Shankar, supra note 104
(describing the work of the SBST).
111. Gamoran, supra note 10; Debra Viadero, U.S. Position on Research Seen in
Flux, EDUC. WEEK (Mar. 4, 2008),
https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2008/03/05/
26research_ep.h27.html [https://perma.cc/2JRY-M4EU].
112. COMM’N ON EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING, supra note 16, at 15.
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using and improving EBPM in practice.113 Soon after the Commission’s
report, the House passed the Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking
Act, seeking to improve “evidence-building activities” coordinated by
OMB;114 a Senate version soon followed,115 and the bill became law early in
2019. 116 The 2017 Congress considered several other proposed bills
intended to improve the generation and uses of data, including the
Legislative Performance Review Act—a bill that would require both houses
of Congress to review GPRA data in budget appropriations decisions.117
State legislators118 and municipal governments 119 have also incorporated
EBPM aspirations and practices in tandem with progress at the federal level.
It is early to appraise how evidence-based practice will fare overall
under the Trump administration, but the administration demonstrably has
a different emphasis.120 A hallmark of the rise of populist government
113. Evidence-Based Policymaking Commission Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-140,
130 Stat. 317 (2016); COMM’N ON EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING, supra note 16.
114. Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act of 2017, H.R. 4174, 115th
Cong. (2017).
115. Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act of 2017, S. 2046, 115th
Cong. (2017).
116. Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115435, 132 Stat. 5529 (2019) (directing OMB to coordinate an “evidencebuilding” plan each year to address “policy-relevant” questions from federal
agencies; establishing a government-wide Interagency Council on Evaluation
Policy; directing OMB to create an Advisory Committee on Data for Evidence
Building; requiring each agency to name a Chief Evaluation Officer and a
Chief Data Officer; and requiring each agency to develop a data inventory as
well as to publish open data in machine-readable format).
117. 1 EVIDENCE USE IN CONGRESS, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR. 12 (Mar. 2018),
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BPC-EvidenceUse-in-Congress.pdf [https://perma.cc/B38T-QA5L].
118. Jeremy L. Hall & Edward T. Jennings Jr., Assessing the Use and Weight of
Information and Evidence in U.S. State Policy Decisions, 29 POL’Y & SOC’Y 137,
137 (2010).
119. WHAT WORKS CITIES, https://whatworkscities.bloomberg.org
[https://perma.cc/XQ7F-DLWK].
120. In the words of one commentator: “President Obama’s regulatory Czar Cass
Sunstein declared that we had moved beyond pro- and anti-regulation
polarization into rule by experts, where ‘state-of-the-art techniques for
anticipating, cataloguing, and monetizing the consequences of regulation’
answer seemingly every major question. I think it is fair to say that this is
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approaches in both the US and the UK has been an aversion to technocratic
expertise.121 As UK Brexit advocate Michael Gove summed it up, “people in
this country have had enough of experts.”122 Salient Obama-era EBPM
programming has been discontinued, such as the behavioral economics
initiative in OMB.123 Trump’s early executive order on regulation required
the repeal of two administrative regulations for every new one passed, a
strategy far from an ideal EBPM playbook. 124
Scientists have overwhelmingly expressed concern about neglect of
empirical evidence in the administration. 125 Indeed, several social
programming decisions to date have made selective use of evidence by
“cherrypicking studies” and emphasizing uncertainty to de-fund
programs.126 The administration has expanded funding for approaches that
have been rejected in systematic reviews of scientific literature, such as
exactly the kind of mindset that Trump ran against. And it is exactly that kind
of mindset that the Trump Administration, in its early days, is repudiating.”
Andrew M. Grossman, An Administration Takes Sides YALE J. REG.: NOTICE AND
COMMENT, (May 25, 2017), http://yalejreg.com/nc/an-administration-takessides-by-andrew-m-grossman [https://perma.cc/7MEU-5PGH].
121. See, e.g., William Davies, Why We Stopped Trusting Elites, GUARDIAN (Nov. 29,
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/nov/29/why-westopped-trusting-elites-the-new-populism [https://perma.cc/4TBW-34HT]
(arguing that trust in public institutions has declined in the UK); Cary Funk
et al., Trust and Mistrust in Americans’ Views of Scientific Experts, PEW RES.
CTR. (2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2019/08/02/trustand-mistrust-in-americans-views-of-scientific-experts/
[https://perma.cc/D9RX-4U2L] (finding that 73% of Democrats but only
43% of Republicans believe that scientists should be active in “scientific
policy debates”).
122. Steven Erlanger, No Charisma, No Glamour: Michael Gove Makes His Case to
Lead Britain, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/07/02/world/europe/brexit-michael-gove-conservative-partybritain.html [https://perma.cc/LK8Q-9JY3].
123. Haskins, supra note 23, at 19.
124. Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb. 3, 2017).
125. See, e.g., MARCH FOR SCIENCE, https://www.marchforscience.com
[https://perma.cc/RPX7-5RUW].
126. Robert Gordon & Ron Haskins, The Trump Administration’s Misleading
Embrace of ‘Evidence’, POLITICO (Mar. 31, 2017, 5:35 AM),
https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/03/the-trumpadministrations-misleading-embrace-of-evidence-000385
[https://perma.cc/2LL5-RN7E].
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funding for abstinence-based sex education.127 The phrases “evidencebased” and “science-based” were standouts on an infamous 2017 list of
politically contentious phrases that CDC officials were instructed to avoid,
perhaps as a means of “self-preservation.”128 Scientific advisory boards
have met less frequently under the Trump administration than in prior
years,129 with more cancelled meetings and fewer scientific expert members
than in prior administrations. Notable committee closures have included
the Department of the Interior’s Advisory Committee on Climate Change
and Natural Resource Science,130 the FDA’s Food Advisory Committee,131
the EPA’s Particulate Matter Review Panel,132 the Advisory Committee for
the Sustained National Climate Assessment, 133 and several panels that
127. See John S. Santelli et al., Abstinence-Only-Until-Marriage: An Updated Review
of U.S. Policies and Programs and Their Impact, 61 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 273
(2017); Kristen Underhill et al., Sexual Abstinence Only Programmes to
Prevent HIV Infection in High Income Countries: Systematic Review, BMJ, July
26, 2007, at 1; Cheryl Wetzstein, Sex-Education Funds to Be Renewed, WASH.
TIMES (Apr. 15, 2015),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/15/sex-educationfunds-to-be-renewed [https://perma.cc/MM4M-VS9V].
128. Instead, CDC personnel have reportedly been instructed to say, “CDC bases
its recommendations on science in consideration with community standards
and wishes”—a movement in terminology that may well capture a more
realistic view of policy development. Brakkton Booker, Trump
Administration Reportedly Instructed CDC on Its Own Version of 7 Dirty Words,
NPR (Dec. 16, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/12/16/
571329234/trump-administration-reportedly-instructs-cdc-on-its-ownversion-of-7-dirty-word [https://perma.cc/GU27-S22C].
129. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, ABANDONING SCIENCE ADVICE: ONE YEAR IN, THE
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION IS SIDELINING SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEES (2018),
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2018/01/abandoningscience-advice-full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7PN-BMD7].
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Lisa Friedman, E.P.A. to Disband a Key Scientific Review Panel on Air Pollution,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/
climate/epa-disbands-pollution-science-panel.html
[https://perma.cc/4RL4-AHTW].
133. Juliet Eilperin, The Trump Administration Just Disbanded a Federal Advisory
Committee on Climate Change, WASH. POST (Aug. 20, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/
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advised OSHA.134 Other scientific panels face new limitations, such as the
Department of Energy’s Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, which has
newly restricted abilities to access information and receive responses from
DOE contractors. 135
A few agency decisions and executive orders, however, have also made
some moves towards promoting randomized trials. The Executive Order
Expanding Apprenticeships in America requests that OMB oversee a
comprehensive evaluation of all “job training programs” administered by
federal agencies, noting, “When feasible, these evaluations shall be
conducted by third party evaluators using the most rigorous methods
appropriate and feasible for the program, with preference given to multisite randomized controlled trials.”136 The Trump HHS has released new
recommendations to guide states in their evaluations of experimental
Medicaid programming, including enforcing prior recommendations to
ensure the independence of evaluators,137 and has been supportive of
statewide randomized trials for evaluating Medicaid waivers.138 (The
Trump HHS has also cancelled long-term data collection for one such

2017/08/20/the-trump-administration-just-disbanded-a-federal-advisorycommittee-on-climate-change [https://perma.cc/EAD2-RE2V].
134. Rebecca Moss, Trump’s Labor Department Eviscerates Workplace Safety
Panels, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/
article/trumps-labor-department-eviscerates-workplace-safety-panels
[https://perma.cc/UVJ5-XYWJ].
135. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOA 0140.1, INTERFACE WITH THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR
FACILITIES SAFETY GUARD (2018), https://www.directives.doe.gov/directivesdocuments/100-series/0140.1-BOrder/@@images/file
[https://perma.cc/GL2B-FKE7]; Rebecca Moss, Trump Administration
Neuters Safety Board, PROPUBLICA (Jul. 22, 2018),
https://www.propublica.org/article/nuclear-safety-board-informationaccess-trump-administration [https://perma.cc/LLK9-F6EC].
136. Exec. Order No. 13801, 82 Fed. Reg. 28229 (June 15, 2017).
137. Section 1115 Demonstrations Developing the Evaluation Design Advisory
Recommendations, CTR. FOR MEDICAID & MEDICARE, https://www.medicaid.gov
/medicaid/section-1115-demo/downloads/evaluation-reports/developingthe-evaluation-design.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6NF-8R8T].
138. Evaluation of the Health and Economic Consequences of Kentucky’s Section
1115 Demonstration Waiver, CLINICALTRIALS.GOV, https://clinicaltrials.gov/
ct2/show/NCT03602456 [https://perma.cc/2YCJ-L3DY].
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waiver, however.139) If Trump’s order requiring the repeal of two
regulations for every one issued140 provokes a retrospective review of
regulation effectiveness, it may be a catalyst for EBPM, but this order
contained no criteria for deciding which regulations are axed.141
3. “Moneyball for Government”
In place of “EBPM,” the catchier term “regulatory moneyball” is gaining
ground in popular discourse.142 The phrase derives from Michael Lewis’s
account of Billy Beane, general manager for the Oakland A’s, who brought
the team to glory by rejecting traditional scouting wisdom in favor of
statistical evidence of players’ skill. “Moneyball for government” promotes
a similar shift toward research evidence as a means of decision-making,
including “build[ing] evidence about the practices, policies, and programs
that will achieve the most effective and efficient results,” and investing
public money accordingly. 143 This is unmistakably a rebranding of EBPM.
Just as moneyball transformed the Oakland A’s, proponents argue that
“data, evidence, and evaluation [can] similarly revolutionize America’s
government . . . by investing in what works, by testing it and retesting it, and
holding ourselves to a higher standard.”144 Other efforts abound: the What
Works Cities initiative publicly evaluates and praises municipal
governments that use data to improve local decisions; 145 the Pew-

139. Virgil Dickson, CMS Scales Back Evaluation Plans for Indiana Medicaid
Waiver, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Apr. 9, 2018),
https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20180409/NEWS/180409915
[https://perma.cc/2GLG-822X].
140. Exec. Order. No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (January 30, 2017).
141. Connor Raso, Assessing Regulatory Retrospective Review Under the Obama
Administration, BROOKINGS, (June 15, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/
research/assessing-regulatory-retrospective-review-under-the-obamaadministration/ [https://perma.cc/K967-KLLH].
142. See, e.g., MONEYBALL FOR GOV’T, supra note 34 (naming “all-star” legislators,
regulators, and academics committed to advancing the uses of empirical
evidence in policy); NUSSLE & ORSZAG, supra note 34; SUNSTEIN, supra note 37,
at ch. 10; Bridgeland & Orszag, supra note 34.
143. Nussle & Orszag, Let’s Play Moneyball, in NUSSLE & ORSZAG, supra note 34, at 6.
144. Id. at 3–4.
145. About, WHAT WORKS CITIES, BLOOMBERG, https://whatworkscities
.bloomberg.org/about [https://perma.cc/9Q44-PMFQ].
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MacArthur Results First initiative supports states seeking to use EBPM; 146
and organizations such as J-PAL,147 Results for America,148 the Coalition for
Evidence-Based Policy,149 the open-data efforts of the Sunlight
Foundation,150 and the continued Behavioral Insights Team in the UK 151 are
visible nongovernmental efforts to promote EBPM in practice.
II. BROKEN EXPERIMENTATION, SHAM EBPM
The positivist ideal of data-driven government is elusive and often
undesirable, but bounded EBPM is both feasible and salutary where policy
ends are benign. EBPM has also been supported by growing congressional
attention and, at least in foregoing administrations, agency efforts to
implement EBPM with evaluation. But despite these intentions, current
practice of EBPM in legislation and regulation is hit-or-miss.
This Part will turn an original focus to ways in which efforts that
resemble EBPM on their face can go wrong. Indeed, I argue that sometimes
these actions go so badly awry that they are not simply incomplete, but are,
instead, sham versions of evidence-based practice. Breakdowns affect the
use of evidence in primary decision-making, as well as the generation of
evidence to evaluate those choices. I will begin with the latter category of
broken experimentation, highlighting some of the design and
implementation flaws that undermine government-led or governmentsponsored evaluations of policy choices. I then argue that there are distinct
pathologies in the link between evidence and decisions (sham EBPM),
ranging from technical breakdowns, to willful neglect, to more disingenuous
uses of “experimentation” and “evidence-based” nomenclature to achieve
values-driven ends.

146. Pew-MacArthur Results First Initiative, PEW TRUST, http://www.pewtrusts
.org/en/projects/pew-macarthur-results-first-initiative
[https://perma.cc/U2G4-QML3].
147. J-PAL, https://www.povertyactionlab.org [https://perma.cc/9FYJ-24F8].
148. RESULTS FOR AM., http://results4america.org [https://perma.cc/GG7S-2DJY].
149. HASKINS & BARON, supra note 96.
150. SUNLIGHT FOUND., https://sunlightfoundation.com [https://perma.cc/557LHACE].
151. BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS TEAM, https://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk
[https://perma.cc/MQ8J-QS8S].
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A. Broken Experimentation
The pathologies of evidence production are many, and no research field
is without serious concerns about research methods and the validity and
reliability of research findings. The evaluation of policy choices is no
exception. In government-led and government-sponsored evaluation of
policy choices, robust evaluation has tended to be the exception rather than
the rule, which has been a stumbling block for efforts to learn from policy
interventions. Failures to embed evaluations with policy choices, along with
methodological flaws present in evaluations that are done, mean that
evidence necessary for well-functioning EBPM is absent or, more
worryingly, misleading.
At the outset, many evaluations simply do not occur. They are timeconsuming and expensive, and there is an understandable emphasis on
using government funds to accomplish the goals of a program, rather than
to evaluate whether the program works as intended. As Orszag has noted,
evaluations “are typically an afterthought when programs are designed—
and once programs have been in place for a while, evaluating them
rigorously becomes difficult from a political economy perspective.”152 A
2013 GAO survey of agency personnel in charge of programming found
widespread support for using evaluation results, but only thirty-seven
percent of personnel reported that any program they oversaw had been
evaluated in the past five years.153 The absence of evaluation hampers
efforts to revisit and update policy choices over time, which is an important

152. Pater Orszag, Building Rigorous Evidence to Drive Policy, OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET (June 8, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/blog/
09/06/08/BuildingRigorousEvidencetoDrivePolicy
[https://perma.cc/P7Y9-MBLN].
153. Of the group who reported past evaluations of agency programs, however, a
majority found those evaluations “moderately” or “greatly” useful for
implementing or planning program changes, assessing effectiveness,
understanding and explaining program impacts, sharing information with
others, developing program goals, allocating resources, streamlining
programs, and supporting budget requests. Notably, concerns about
evidence relevancy and credibility, evidentiary disagreements, lack of
regulators’ commitment to research, and ability to use evidence were
consistently ranked as “small” or “none.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO 13-570, PROGRAM EVALUATION: STRATEGIES TO FACILITATE AGENCIES’ USE OF
EVALUATION IN PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND POLICY MAKING 15 (2013),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655518.pdf [https://perma.cc/5S3ZQH85].
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capacity given the limitations of using past evidence to predict future policy
effects.
When government-led policy evaluations do occur, they are often
limited to performance evaluations (rather than impact evaluations) and
lack control groups. Although a one-group, pre-post study is useful for some
questions, such as whether it is administratively feasible to deliver a
program, it does very little to assess the impact of a program on outcomes
of interest. And where evaluations use control groups, many miss the
opportunity to use random assignment to enable an assessment of program
effects. Randomized trials derive their methodological strength from the
fact that individual participants are assigned to the treatment vs. control
group purely on the basis of chance, rather than on the basis of any
characteristic that might lead to systematic differences among the
groups. 154 Differences between the groups after the policy is implemented,
therefore, can be conclusively linked to the policy itself, rather than any
other known or unknown confounder.
Despite the advantages of randomization, there is often resistance to
using this methodological tool. This reluctance often reflects strong
normative commitments in favor of (or against) a policy choice—namely,
the belief that it would be inequitable to withhold a presumed benefit from
one group (or to inflict a presumed harm on one group) on the basis of
chance.155 Legal concerns about randomization have generally failed in
judicial challenges to randomized studies.156 Randomization may indeed be
ethically questionable if there is not genuine uncertainty about whether a
new or existing policy is more effective. Here, policy-makers’ and
researchers’ normative commitments—which are part of the bounded
objectivity of science described above—may limit the choices of research
design.
But despite past resistance to the use of randomization to evaluate
policy impacts,157 randomized trials are gaining new attention, 158 as are
methods that approximate but do not perfectly comply with randomization.

154. Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929 (2011);
Gordon H. Guyatt et al., Users’ Guide to the Medical Literature XXV. EvidenceBased Medicine: Principles for Applying the Users’ Guides to Patient Care, 284
JAMA 1290 (2000).
155. Colleen Chien, Rigorous Policy Pilots, 104 IOWA L. REV 2313, at 2318 (2019).
156. Id.
157. Abramowicz et al., supra note 154.
158. SUNSTEIN, supra note 37, at 189.
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These include staged rollouts of programs (which allow a temporary control
group to get the program after a delay) or implementation of policies
depending on cutoff points (e.g., benefits on the basis of a federal poverty
line cutoff).159 Randomization has its scientific critics,160 but where trials
are large, attentive to subgroups and outcomes of interest, and reported
appropriately, they are the most rigorous means of assessing the causal
impact of interventions.161
Randomization is not the end of the matter. Even evaluations that use
random assignment will fail to measure program impacts if they are
statistically underpowered —namely, if there are too few people enrolled
in the study to detect differences between people who receive the
intervention and people who do not.162 Small evaluations are cheaper and
more easily controlled, and they exempt fewer people from policies that
regulators or the legislature expect to be helpful. But where they lack
statistical power to identify the impacts of the program, they are a waste of
evaluation resources and will be biased toward showing a lack of program
effectiveness.
Another pitfall for evaluations of governmental programs is a failure to
assess outcomes of importance, including outcomes of importance for the
individuals who experience the policy. This verges on a democratic
legitimacy issue. Ideally, the design of a policy trial would ex ante specify
outcomes that reveal whether the policy achieves those goals. For example,
a trial of after-school programming designed to improve academic
performance should indeed assess the short- and long-term impacts on
children’s academic performance. But such programs may also yield
benefits through other pathways, such as providing safer after-school
supervision for children while parents work outside the home. Policy-

159. COUNCIL ECON. ADVISERS, https://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/ (last visited Dec.
21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/M2LH-QEXC].
160. RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIALS AND EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY: A
MULTIDISCIPLINARY DIALOGUE, 210 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1 (Ichiro Kawachi et al. eds.,
2018).
161. John P. A. Ioannidis, Randomized Controlled Trials: Often Flawed, Mostly
Useless, Clearly Indispensable: A Commentary on Deaton and Cartwright, 210
SOC. SCI. & MED. 53 (2018).
162. Michael Sanders & Aisling Ni Chonaire, “Powered to Detect Small Effect Sizes”:
You Keep Saying That. I Do Not Think It Means What You Think it Means. (Ctr.
for Market & Public Org., Working Paper No. 15/337, 2015),
http://www.bris.ac.uk/media-library/sites/cmpo/documents/WP15337
_Web_Version.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3Q3-T2FB].
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makers may not wish to continue funding for programs on the basis of these
positive externalities should they fail to improve academic performance.
They may decide that those positive externalities are better served by
another program or funding stream, or that they do not deserve
governmental funding at all. But a failure to measure all outcomes of
practical relevance, including positive and negative externalities, may cause
evaluations to underestimate, or overestimate, the full benefits and costs of
those governmental choices. Planning a policy trial must therefore entail
groundwork to identify outcomes of relevance not only for assessing
whether the program works as intended, but also for assessing whether the
program has additional, perhaps unintended impacts.
Two structural factors are also important to secure an evaluation that
is as free from bias as possible: investigator independence and a priori
transparency about evaluation methodology and planned outcomes.
Although best-practices research methodology is objective, there is
nonetheless leeway for researchers to exercise judgment when specifying
hypotheses, including relevant outcomes, planning statistical tests, and
managing data limitations. Ensuring that studies are done by a party
without a stake in the results is an important priority for limiting bias in the
exercise of those judgments. Pre-publication of evaluation methodology is
also a crucial strategy to defend against statistical fishing expeditions,
selective outcome reporting, and the “file drawer problem” (by which
nonsignificant findings are not released).163 Experiences in medical
literature with mandatory pre-registration of clinical trials have shown that
pre-publication of study methods and hypotheses leads to the reporting of
smaller treatment effect estimates,164 suggesting that the strategy provides
a defense against selective outcome reporting.

163. Annie Franco, Neil Malhotra & Gabor Simonovits, Publication Bias in the
Social Sciences: Unlocking the File Drawer, 345 SCI. 1502 (2014).
164. An-Wen Chan, Bias, Spin, and Misreporting: Time for Full Access to Trial
Protocols and Results, 5 PLOS MED. 1533 (2008); Agnèn Dechartres et al.,
Association Between Trial Registration and Treatment Effect Estimates: A
Meta-Epidemiological Study, 14 BMC MED. 1 (2016); Sylvain Mathieu et al.,
Comparison of Registered and Published Primary Outcomes in Randomized
Controlled Trials, 30 JAMA 977 (2009); Deborah A. Zarin et al., The
ClinicalTrials.gov Results Database – Update and Key Issues, 364 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 852 (2011). But see Shane Killeen, Registration Rates, Adequacy of
Registration, and a Comparison of Registered and Published Primary Outcomes
in Randomized Controlled Trials Published in Surgery Journals, 259 ANNALS
SURGERY 193 (2014).
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There have been some improvements in researcher independence and
evaluation transparency, at least in the healthcare context. Here, the
experience of CMS in overseeing mandatory state-led evaluations of
experimental (§ 1115) Medicaid programming is instructive. A recent
report by GAO noted deep-seated methodological problems in these
evaluations, including a lack of control groups, selection of inappropriate
control groups, and a lack of statistical power due to small sample sizes. 165
Most evaluations prior to 2014 had been completed by the states
themselves, without use of an independent outside investigator. Before the
Affordable Care Act, these evaluations were also private, and evaluation
reports were issued to CMS long after the window for program reapproval
had passed (by which time reapproval had already been issued). 166 In 2014,
however, CMS began to require states implementing experimental Medicaid
programming to use an independent evaluator, and the agency began to
specify in state approval letters that evaluations must use control groups
and report on study limitations. The Affordable Care Act also requires prior
publication of evaluation methods, suggesting that this protection may be
feasible for other types of policy evaluation.
Research that evaluates legislation, regulation, and governmental
programs is not alone in these limitations. These drawbacks are pervasive
in much of medical research as well, and they are the subject of ongoing
critique and concern.167 Research on the effectiveness of governmental
choices can therefore learn from best practices in medicine and other fields
grappling with these problems. The problems I have identified are also a
partial list; a host of other concerns matter in assessing policy research
initiated or sponsored by the government, including questions about data
infrastructure, reporting, privacy, and data linkages across agencies. But in
this preliminary discussion, I have intended to raise some of the most
salient ways in which evaluations can fail to identify “what works.”

165. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MEDICAID DEMONSTRATIONS: EVALUATIONS
YIELDED LIMITED RESULTS UNDERSCORING NEED FOR CHANGES TO FEDERAL POLICIES
AND PROCEDURES (2018), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-220
[https://perma.cc/3BS5-CTHJ] [hereinafter MEDICAID DEMONSTRATIONS].
166. Id.
167. Iain Chalmers & Paul Glasziou, Avoidable Waste in the Production and
Reporting of Research Evidence, 374 LANCET 86 (2009).
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B. Sham EBPM
Pathologies of evidence production are likely to be resolved more easily
than pathologies in evidence application. Because methodological best
practices exist for empirical research, and because research is generally
reported in sufficient detail to understand departure from those practices,
errors in research are often visible and correctable. But mistaken or
disingenuous applications of empirical evidence may be harder to detect. I
propose here a typology of ways in which feedback loops between empirical
evidence and policy choices can break down, such that EBPM is unlikely to
function in a particular policy context.
1. Technical Breakdowns
Technical breakdowns occur when regulators and legislators intend to
draw on empirical evidence, but are unable to do so due to practical
failures—for example, inability to find evidence, lack of time or financial
resources to support research, lack of relationships with people who
produce or interpret research, and lack of capacity to interpret evidence.168
The impact of technical breakdowns may be a partial EBPM process—an
attempt to use whatever evidence is available, to the extent possible—and
a resulting decision that is suboptimal or ineffective, but perhaps still touted
as “evidence-based.” Some of these problems are intractable; as described
above, the bounded rationality of policy-makers and bounded objectivity of
scientific research can affect the generation and use of evidence,
contributing to technical breakdowns even among good-faith EBPM
proponents. But many of these limitations could be mitigated with sufficient
time and resources, such as allocating funds for independent panels to
synthesize research on policy questions, expanding and funding evaluation
mandates, or building legislative capacity to identify and use empirical
research.
Although technical breakdowns may be inadvertent, they may also
reflect deliberate choices by policy-makers to spend finite resources on
parsing and generating research evidence. The attention, financial support,
and technical capacity needed to engage in a robust form of EBPM may be
considerable, which poses opportunity costs for legislators and regulators
with limited time, attention, and budgets for staff and research. Although
policy-makers may support the goals of EBPM, valid concerns about the
time and effort needed to sift through research evidence may undermine
168. See, e.g., Oliver, supra note 36.
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EBPM in practice. Given these constraints, “muddling through” with
imperfect information may be an understandable and even optimal choice
given tradeoffs with other priorities.
EBPM advocates should continue to seek ways to make engagement
with research cheaper and easier, as well as ways to encourage the
development of research that is immediately responsive to policy
priorities.169 Some of the solutions identified below for advancing EBPM are
comparatively cheap, such as promoting evaluation transparency, making
ex ante policy commitments tied to planned evaluation research, or asking
for teams of rivals in independent evaluations. Other solutions are more
expensive, such as enacting and funding rigorous evaluation mandates. The
Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act describes a centralized,
OMB-led effort to amass statistical evidence,170 which benefits from
economies of scale.
2. Evidence Distortion
A more insidious breakdown in the feedback loop between evidence
and policy is the deliberate exclusion or distortion of evidence to facilitate
decisions that are based on political preferences, unfettered by contrary
research findings. These outcomes are likely when values are in conflict;
removing choices to neutral technocratic territory is unlikely when there is
dispute over what values should govern the choice.171 When decisionmakers manipulate the available evidence to support their political choices,
however, they co-opt the scientific legitimacy of an “evidence-based”
approach.
Here, I consider evidence distortion that is deliberate; I posit that
decision-makers know the evidence they are suppressing, and that they
understand how they are misrepresenting research findings. But these
pathologies are exacerbated by the bounded rationality of decision-makers,
the bounded objectivity of science, the bounded capacity of science to
measure outcomes that matter (particularly value-laden concerns), and the
need to preserve political participation alongside the role of research
169. For a call for research that is responsive to federal agency needs, see Chien,
supra note 155.
170. See Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act of 2017, Pub. L. No.
115-435, 132 Stat. 5529 (2019).
171. See, e.g., Claire Huntington, The Empirical Turn in Family Law, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. 227 (2018) (arguing for clarity on which values should govern a choice,
before the turn to empirical research).
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evidence. Regulators with bounded rationality may believe that they are
seeing the evidence clearly, whereas their comprehension of research is
instead shaped by cultural concerns and predictable cognitive biases.
Political participants in policy development may also exaggerate concerns
about bounded scientific objectivity, bounded capacity to measure
meaningful outcomes, and the bounded authority of science to dismiss or
halt unwelcome but valid studies (or to elevate research findings that align
with their political norms). Purposeful, disingenuous evidence distortion is
thus its own form of breakdown, but the inherent limitations of EBPM can
exacerbate this problem.
A few examples may be instructive. Upward Bound is a federally funded
program intended to assist poor students prepare for college. An
independent experimental evaluation of Upward Bound began in 1991,
funded by the U.S. Department of Education. The results of this study were
disappointing, suggesting that although students were more likely to
acquire high school math credit and earn a vocational license, there was no
detectable effect on graduation rates, grades, college enrollment, or college
degree completion.172 A second randomized study of the program was
intended to begin in the late 2000s, around the time that the first round of
evaluation reports was released. Congress, however, barred the use of
federal funds for this evaluation in its 2008 budget appropriations, 173 and
the Higher Education Act of 2008 stipulated that future evaluations should
focus on “identify[ing] . . . project practices that are effective”; moreover, the
Secretary could not require Upward Bound grantees to agree to an
evaluation that “requires the eligible entity to recruit additional students . . .
; or results in the denial of services for an eligible student.”174 These actions
effectively barred the use of randomized assignment in future Upward
Bound evaluations. 175 Rather than expose the project to further study,
Congress halted the creation of evidence that might interfere with the
reauthorization of Upward Bound funds.
Evaluations of a federal school voucher program in Washington, D.C.
met a similar fate. In the spring of 2017, a randomized study identified
harmful results of the federal voucher program for students who received
172. National Evaluations of Upward Bound, MATHEMATICAL POL’Y RESEARCH,
https://www.mathematica-mpr.com/our-publications-and-findings/
projects/upward-bound [https://perma.cc/Q8NQ-MV6E].
173. Viadero, supra note 111.
174. Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315, 122 Stat. 3078
(2008).
175. See Viadero, supra note 111.
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vouchers, compared to applicants who did not. 176 A week later, Congress
proposed legislation that barred the use of randomized controlled trials to
evaluate the program in future years. 177 Again, the legislation was justified
in terms of “not deny[ing] scholarships to certain students placed into a
control group.” But the timing of this change was no coincidence, given that
the initial evaluation results were contrary to the political preferences of
legislators promoting the program. The program has been reauthorized
through 2019 with an appropriation of $17.5 million. 178
Congress is not the only set of policy makers to suppress unfavorable
evidence. In recent months, many have noted actions taken by the EPA
under the direction of administrator Scott Pruitt. In rules issued in the fall
of 2017, the EPA barred those who receive agency grant money from
serving on panels that advise the agency on regulatory decisions—a move
that precluded many academic researchers from providing scientific
expertise on these panels. 179 In the aftermath of the new rule, the number
of academic researchers on boards fell by fifty percent, while the number of
board members from regulated industries tripled. 180 Before his departure
from the agency, Pruitt issued a set of proposed regulations for notice and

176. MARK DYNARSKI ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE DC OPPORTUNITY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM:
IMPACTS AFTER ONE YEAR (U.S. Department of Education, 2017), available at
https://ies.ed.gov/ncee/pubs/20174022/pdf/20174022.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SS4Y-LJLF].
177. Sarah D. Sparks, Congress Budget Deal Bans New Gold-Standard Studies of
Federal Vouchers, EDUC. WEEK BLOGS (May 2, 2017), https://
blogs.edweek.org/edweek/inside-school-research/2017/05/congress
_budget_deal_bans_new.html [https://perma.cc/9FVC-H6VY]; see also
Gamoran, supra note 35.
178. See Congressional Research Service, District of Columbia Opportunity
Scholarship Program (DC OSP): Overview, Implementation, and Issues 1
(2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45581.pdf [https://perma.cc/HZ8C7M7J].
179. EPA, Administrator Pruitt Issues Directive to Ensure Independence, Geographic
Diversity & Integrity in EPA Science Committees (Oct. 31, 2017),
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/administrator-pruitt-issues-directiveensure-independence-geographic-diversity [https://perma.cc/V9MF-5V96].
180. Swamp Science: Scott Pruitt Embarks on a Campaign to Stifle Science at the
EPA, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.economist.com/unitedstates/2018/04/26/scott-pruitt-embarks-on-a-campaign-to-stifle-scienceat-the-epa [https://perma.cc/U5KR-4Z7J].
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comment, entitled “Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science.”181
If enacted, the regulations will limit the agency’s ability to consider scientific
studies that do not make the underlying data publicly available—which is
impossible given the human subjects protections in place for many
academic research studies, particularly those using datasets like medical
records.182 Proposed legislation in Congress would have taken similar steps
if successful.183
These are visible examples, set out in agency orders or legislation. More
subtle exclusion of evidence is achieved by simply not considering it,
weighing unfavorable evidence lightly, or subjecting favorable vs.
unfavorable evidence to differing levels of methodological scrutiny.
Empirical evidence cannot resolve every conflict. Some decisions
cannot be made without first resolving thoroughgoing conflicts of values,
because there is little agreement about what question evidence should
answer. For instance, empirical evidence is surely relevant to the question
of whether medical providers who perform abortions not necessary to save
the life of the mother should be eligible to participate in Medicaid. There is
evidence pertaining to the other medical services those providers perform,
the quality of those services, and the likely effects on access to healthcare of
excluding those providers from Medicaid reimbursement. But if history is
any guide, policy-makers’ choices about whether to cover these providers
will not draw on this evidence.
Why won’t evidence help? The dispute is ideological—we are, as policy
scholar Roger Pielke, Jr. would say, in the realm of “abortion politics,” not
the realm of “tornado politics.” In abortion politics, information is used to
rationalize, to help justify decision commitments already made, to provide
181. Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science, 83 Fed. Reg. 18768
(proposed Apr. 20, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.C. pt. 30).
182. Kathleen Rest & Georges C. Benjamin, Trump’s EPA Puts Our Health at Risk,
SCI. AM. (Jul. 13, 2018),
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/trumps-epa-puts-ourhealth-at-risk [https://perma.cc/D34S-884W]; Jeremy Berg et al., Letters,
Joint Statement on EPA Proposed Rule and Public Availability of Data, 360 SCI.
(May 4, 2018), http://science.sciencemag.org/content/360/6388/eaau0116
[https://perma.cc/7UU3-BE3F]; Alaska Community Action on Toxics et al.,
Comment Letter on Inadequate Opportunity for Public Engagement—
Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science (June 20, 2018),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OA-2018-0259-3644
[https://perma.cc/7VSP-DE8M].
183. HONEST Act, H.R. 1430, 115th Cong. (2017); see also Swamp Science, supra
note 180.
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narrative, and to shore up power. In tornado politics, information is used to
assess decision alternatives, to evaluate choices, to deduce possibilities, and
to make decisions.184 Abortion politics extends to many realms—consider,
for example, debates over gun control, the death penalty, climate change,
immigration, and nondiscrimination law. Tornado politics, by contrast, is
comparatively anodyne, with current examples perhaps extending to
funding for opioid abuse treatment, infrastructure improvements, and
defense spending—all of which have given rise to bills passed with
bipartisan support in recent years.
Evidence may indeed have its uses in abortion politics, but enough
repetition should convince us that this evidence is doing little to inform the
choices being made. And indeed, empirical evidence may make the difficult
values-based conversations about abortion more difficult. 185 As Pielke
notes, “Conflation, often willful, of Abortion and Tornado Politics
encourages the mapping of established interests from across the political
spectrum onto science and then uses science as a proxy for political battle
over those interests.”186 This may be inevitable given the bounded
rationality limitations noted above, and, in fact, there is reason to believe
that importing scientific evidence into these conversations will make them
more polarized.187 We should not, however, delude ourselves into believing
that this is “evidence-based” policy. And we should not overlook the harm
that the misuse of this label may pose to policies that do derive from
empirical evidence.
3. Terminal Experimentation
Another interruption in the feedback loop between evidence and policy
is the cultivation of uncertainty in order to justify using experimental
policies as a stand-in for more decisive action—either as a substitute for
doing nothing, or as a substitute for doing something more lasting and
impactful. In either of these situations, there may not be political
momentum to achieve a preferred policy goal—some may wish to make a
184. ROGER A. PIELKE, THE HONEST BROKER: MAKING SENSE OF SCIENCE IN POLICY AND
POLITICS 40–43 (2007).
185. Id. at 47.
186. Id. (noting that “scientific information . . . would represent a distraction from
the task of reconciling different value commitments through bargaining,
negotiation, and compromise”).
187. DAN M. KAHAN ET AL., AFFECT, VALUES, AND NANOTECHNOLOGY RISK PERCEPTIONS: AN
EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION (2007).
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long-term financial investment in a form of social programming, for
example, but there is insufficient political will to do so. Or, conversely, some
may wish to abolish a category of social programming entirely, but they may
be unable to persuade others to do so. From either direction, classifying
activities as “experimental” and amplifying uncertainty about long-term
effects is one means of achieving political buy-in. It is easier to agree to a
time-limited experiment with finite resources and commitment, compared
to supporting a full-fledged course of policy action that commits a larger set
of resources and subjects a larger proportion of the population to the
intervention. Asking others to buy into an experiment also benefits from the
halo of scientific legitimacy. Even if a program is itself of uncertain
effectiveness, attaching an evaluation connotes good faith on the part of the
experimenter, and it implicitly promises to revisit the policy choice when
the experiment concludes.
All of this may be acceptable and even salutary in the short term,
especially when such efforts are accompanied by genuine and wellresourced evaluations. The results of those evaluations can indeed inform
policy choices, including longer-term investments and codifications of
policy choices in law. In the short term, this is EBPM working as intended.
But in the long term, there is a danger that the evolution from pilot study
to more stable policy (including scaling up or scaling down, as warranted)
will not occur. When there is strong momentum against a longer-term
policy, continued experimentation becomes “symbolic”—it is pathological
when “experiments are conducted to replace real action with symbolic
action.”188 Typically, this is understood to be a move in a conservative
direction.189 Namely, emphasizing uncertainty about program impacts
would justify small-scale experimentation as permanent stasis, rather than
proceeding to larger-scale programming and a stable funding stream. It
need not be thus, however; we could imagine governmental programming
that does not work and is unambiguously unsupported by evidence.
Terminal experimentation would exaggerate scientific uncertainty to justify
the continuation of such programming as a pilot or time-limited choice,
rather than using evidence to eliminate it.
As with evidence distortion, the pathology of terminal experimentation
has plenty of help from some of the inherent boundaries on EBPM.
Normative, cultural, and political commitments may make policy-makers
skeptical of programmatic choices, which will contribute to skepticism
regarding study findings. Those who seek to hold programs in long-term
188. GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 83, at 47.
189. Id. (calling symbolic experimentation an “inherently conservative force”).
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limbo might also draw on the bounded objectivity and authority of science
to impugn the findings of past research and to call for new studies with
minor tweaks. Those who are unsatisfied with policy choices on grounds
that are harder to measure, such as concerns about dignity or distributional
effects, are unlikely to be convinced by research studies that do not account
for these concerns. Like evidence distortion, terminal experimentation
fundamentally suggests a deliberate choice—here, the choice to replace
action with indefinite, symbolic experimentation. But the inherent
limitations on EBPM furnish ammunition that amplifies the problem.
The line between EBPM as intended and terminal experimentation is
difficult to fix, but it invokes questions of intent. In terminal
experimentation, policy-makers deliberately seek to exaggerate scientific
uncertainty in order to avoid long-term programmatic choices. If the intent
of the decision-makers is to avoid the entrenchment of a program (or,
conversely, to maintain a program despite lackluster evaluations), terminal
experimentation is likely. For example, David Super’s research on safety-net
programming provides a compelling argument that an experimental
approach in welfare policy has served not only to undermine the long-term
stability of welfare programs, but also to allow capture of state welfare
programming by adverse political interests. 190 On this view,
experimentation is not just a means of avoiding more permanent policies,
but it can also provide a platform for undermining policy goals. This takes
advantage of the same dynamic mentioned above—it is easier to secure
agreement to change that is “experimental” in nature, rather than a
permanent policy change, and the entrenchment of ongoing experiments as
a mode of policy operation can allow long-term acquiescence to those
changes.
4. Ratcheting
A final interruption in the link between evidence and policy is the
deliberate misuse of evidence for ratcheting. This reflects the selective use
of empirical evidence to mask a unilateral, values-driven project: evidence
is consulted, but only the findings that support a preexisting political goal
are used, and those findings are applied far more broadly than is warranted.
The conclusions of this sham EBPM process are thus predetermined by
politics, and they reach further than the evidence would support. The
problem of ratcheting escalates when there is a lack of consensus on which

190. David Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and
the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2008).
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outcomes matter for determining that a program “works.” Many programs
do not work, or they work for some outcomes and not others, and the
outcomes we care about will depend on our policy preferences. When the
effect of a program is mixed—there are benefits for some outcomes but not
others—a motivated decision-maker relies only on selected outcomes to
justify a wholesale decision to discard (or, theoretically, scale up) funding
for the category of programming.
The use of EBPM for ratcheting is typically associated with dismantling
social programming, and efforts by Republican administrations to promote
policy evaluation have stoked fears that the results will be used purely for
funding cuts.191 Deborah Stack has described this dynamic among agency
administrators reacting to the Bush-era PART program: “[B]ecause rigorous
evaluations of whole programs usually produced null findings, agencies
viewed evaluation as a threat rather than as a tool for program
improvement. They feared that Republicans might use null findings as a
reason to cut program funding.”192 Indeed, analyses have found that under
the Bush administration, PART scores were more likely to result in
proposed budget cuts for programs created under a Democratic
administration. “Put more simply, liberal programs were exposed to the
risks of performance budgeting, while conservative programs were not.”193
The converse may, however, also be true if administrators were to
selectively use empirical results (say, findings for secondary or irrelevant
outcomes) to expand and entrench programs that made little difference on
outcomes of importance.
Where individual policy efforts do not perform well, there is little
argument to continue funding them without change. Decommissioning
programs that are ineffective is an important part of the efficiency rationale
for EBPM. But the concern with ratcheting is that instead of just de-funding
an ineffective approach to a policy goal (e.g., Upward Bound for promoting
high school graduation, D.A.R.E. for reducing substance use), policy-makers
reacting to negative or null results will de-fund the entire policy goal
without reallocating resources to other means of achieving the goal. Say, for
example, that D.A.R.E. has proven ineffective for reducing drug use among
adolescents.194 An administrator or legislator engaging in ratcheting would
191. Stack, supra note 74.
192. Id.
193. Moynihan, supra note 98, at 14.
194. Indeed, it is ineffective, as generations of evaluations have shown. Steven L.
West & Keri K. O’Neal, Project D.A.R.E. Outcome Effectiveness Revisited, 94 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 1027 (2004).
194

BROKEN EXPERIMENTATION, SHAM EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY

use the finding to eliminate funding for the entire category of youth
substance abuse prevention—a shift in priority rather than just a shift in
programming. Instead, responses that avoid ratcheting would include
testing efforts to reform the program or reallocating those funds to different
approaches for achieving substance use prevention.
As with the other forms of sham EBPM, the tactical use of evidence for
ratcheting is exacerbated by some of EBPM’s inherent limitations.
Boundedly rational policy-makers are likely to find studies more credible if
the results align with their political priorities, and they are more likely to
dismiss studies that do not as flawed. They can call upon concerns about
scientific objectivity, unquantifiable concerns, and the concerns of other
political actors to dismiss studies or results that do not support their
preexisting normative project. Intentional ratcheting is thus a deliberate
choice, but it again gains momentum from other limitations that make
EBPM difficult.
The Trump administration has provided several examples of how
program evaluations may be used for ratcheting. President Trump’s
proposed budget in 2017 included $3 billion in cuts to community
development grants, as well as $2 billion in cuts to after-school
programming. Budget Director Mick Mulvaney justified the cuts in the
language of evidence: the programs were “not showing any results” or were
lacking in rigorous evaluations. 195 In fact, the community development
grants included funding for Meals on Wheels, which does have health
benefits; the program also included many other types of grants to over
1,200 local governments. 196 Rather than reallocate the funding to more
effective program options, however, the budget abolished it entirely. Two
longtime advocates of EBPM have identified why these cuts were an abuse
of the language of EBPM—namely that they free-ride on scientific legitimacy
to change policy priorities:
[E]vidence can only go so far. . . . [N]o policy evaluation can tell us
the right amount to invest in the endeavors of helping kids learn or
helping parents manage their lives . . . . And yet cut these efforts is
precisely what the Trump budget does. It reduces education
spending by $9 billion . . . . That is a reflection of values. Program
evaluation is of no relevance.197

195. Gordon & Haskins, supra note 126.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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In other words, program evaluations may have justified reallocating
funding to another type of after-school programming, particularly if there
was consensus that the only purpose of the funding was to promote
academic achievement and not to support working families. But program
evaluations would not have justified ratcheting: de-funding an entire
category of social programming on the basis of selective results.
Another example arises from the field of teen pregnancy prevention.
Under the Teen Pregnancy Prevention Program (TPPP), created by the
Obama administration, HHS awarded federal grants to 84 organizations to
implement pregnancy prevention programming, with an emphasis on
services for teens of color. Programs were required to include impact
evaluations. In July of 2017, HHS gave notice to all funded programs that
their funds were rescinded; instead of being funded through 2020, the
programs would be terminated after another year, and the president’s
budget proposed eliminating the program entirely. HHS justified these
funding cuts on the basis of evidence: in the words of an HHS spokesperson,
“Of the 37 projects funded and evaluated for a 2016 report, 73 percent had
no impact or had a negative impact on behavior.”198 Some of these grantees
have filed suit, and at least five have now won preliminary motions in
federal court.199 In the meantime, the administration has released funding
opportunity announcements for programming that does not use one of 48
programs previously determined by HHS to be effective, but instead selects
one of two approaches that promote sexual abstinence.200
These are cuts by ratcheting: eliminating an entire category of
programming, despite the fact that some eliminated activities are beneficial
or of unknown effectiveness. The redirection of funds to other methods of
achieving the same program goal is less in keeping with ratcheting. But here,
peer-reviewed literature has for decades found that abstinence-only
198. Alison Kodjak, Trump Administration Sued over Ending Funding of Teen
Pregnancy Programs, NPR (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.npr.org/
sections/health-shots/2018/02/15/585879601/trump-administrationsued-for-ending-funding-of-teen-pregnancy-programs
[https://perma.cc/8DZX-QEYW].
199. Jessie Hellmann, Judge Orders Trump Officials to Process Grants for Teen
Pregnancy Programs, THE HILL (June 4, 2018),
http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/390572-court-sides-with-grantees-inclass-action-lawsuit-over-teen-pregnancy [https://perma.cc/3U5Z-4SK6].
200. Jessica Boyer, The Teen Pregnancy Prevention Program Was on the Right
Track, Now It’s Being Dismantled, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (May 24, 2018),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180523.207226/full
[https://perma.cc/4QKM-H3SS].
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programming is ineffective for achieving the stated goal of pregnancy
prevention, 201 the standards used here to appraise evidence for the two
types of programming are thoroughly different, and no observer familiar
with this evidence base would agree that this is EBPM working as intended.
Yet another example comes from recent HHS cuts to the budget for
“navigators”: nonprofit organizations that help sign people up for health
insurance on the exchanges. The statutory purpose of navigators is to fulfill
several functions: namely, they must “perform public education and
outreach activities; distribute fair and impartial enrollment information on
health plans and the availability of federal subsidies; facilitate enrollment in
qualified health plans; provide referrals to appropriate agencies for
grievances or complaints; and provide all information in a manner that is
linguistically and culturally appropriate for the consumer.”202 Evaluations
thus far have suggested that navigators do, in fact, prompt insurance
signups.203 But under the Trump administration, HHS has cut navigator
funds by more than eighty percent total, framing the decision as justified by
evidence that navigators sign up fewer people than insurance agents and
brokers (who differ from navigators because they receive commissions on
the basis of the products they sell; navigators are barred from doing so).204
HHS officials announced seventeen navigator programs that had signed up
one-hundred people or fewer, but rather than reallocating funds to other
navigator programs, the entire navigator budget was cut.
Without mechanisms in place to preserve funding allocations—such
that ineffective approaches within funding categories are discontinued, but
that funds are reallocated to program reform or effective approaches within
201. Underhill et al., supra note 127.
202. Sarah Goodell et al., Health Policy Brief: Navigators and Assisters in the Third
Open Enrollment Period, HEALTH AFF. (Sept. 28, 2015),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20150928.132418/full
[https://perma.cc/VCE6-XDVS].
203. Benjamin D. Sommers et al., The Impact of State Policies on ACA Applications
and Enrollment Among Low-Income Adults in Arkansas, Kentucky, and Texas,
34 HEALTH AFF. 1010 (2015); Goodell et al., supra note 202; Michele
Thornton, The Role of External Support in Health Insurance Decision-Making
Under the Affordable Care Act (Jan. 29, 2018) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
University of Illinois at Chicago), https://indigo.uic.edu/
handle/10027/22603 [https://perma.cc/3E4M-7F3G].
204. Robert Pear, Trump Officials Slash Grants that Help Consumers Get
Obamacare, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
07/10/us/politics/trump-affordable-care-act.html
[https://perma.cc/H5NA-SL9S].
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the same category—the fear of ratcheting will attend any serious calls for
program evaluation, especially under conservative administrations. This
can lead to gaming, avoidance of rigorous evaluation methods, and
reluctance to provide the evidence that would be useful for long-term policy
choices.
III. THE COSTS (AND BENEFITS) OF SHAM EBPM
When the uses and generation of evidence veer so far from EBPM as to
be “sham,” there are adverse consequences measured not only against ideal
policies (policy choices miss opportunities to be more effective), but also
against the status quo (policy choices inflict new harm). Herein I will
distinguish between broken experimentation and sham application of
evidence, and I consider numerous ways in which sham applications of
evidence can be harmful. These include wasting resources on ineffective
policies, free-riding on the credibility of “evidence-based” terminology, and
undermining scientific legitimacy. Some of these are also hazards of broken
experimentation, which poses additional harms to human subjects. Flimsy
experimentation, however, may also pose some positive externalities—
even when evidence does not inform primary policy decisions as intended,
rigorous evaluations may nonetheless inform choices in other policy and
practice settings (collateral EBPM), improve policy implementation by
agencies who are aware that they are being evaluated (the Hawthorne
effect), and produce evidence that clarifies the stakes of values-based
reasoning even if it does not drive the policy choice. The goal of this Part is
to identify the costs and inadvertent benefits of sham EBPM processes, with
an eye toward proposals that limit or minimize these harms.
A. Welfare and Efficiency
It is easiest to see the threats that broken experimentation and sham
EBPM pose to welfare and efficiency. Halfhearted or subversive flaws in the
generation and use of evidence can waste governmental resources, or, in the
case of ratcheting, result in the wholesale cutting of categories of
programming that serve valuable social ends. Moreover, sham EBPM that
proceeds to neglect or distort evidence can result in outcomes that are
either inefficient or harmful in relation to the stated policy goals.
To consider broken experimentation first, it is clear at the outset that
rigorous evaluations can be expensive. A methodologically strong
evaluation will need to cover independent evaluators, the generation of the
study protocol, data collection and management, data analysis, and public
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reporting, among other costs. Appropriating funds for evaluation may cut
into program budgets, and lack of resources is a principal reason for poorquality evaluations in programs such as Medicaid Section 1115 waivers.205
But failing to spend sufficient funds for high-quality evaluation can
paradoxically turn well-intended evaluation dollars into waste. Spending
too little can lead to a flimsy design, such as a pre-post evaluation that lacks
a control group, that fails to measure important outcomes, or that lacks
independence. When evaluations are fatally flawed in their methodology—
when they are broken—evaluation funds are wasted resources.
Policy evaluations are not the only subset of research that gives rise to
wasted experimentation funds; indeed, some of the top medical journals
have recently dedicated space to soul-searching about the utility of clinical
research.206 At the outset of a powerful series on waste in medical research
published by the Lancet, evidence-based medicine advocate Iain Chalmers
identifies waste arising from breakdowns at every set of the research
process: (1) failures to ask questions that are high-priority and novel; (2)
failures to use appropriate research designs, methods, and analysis; (3)
inadequate or costly compliance with research oversight burdens; (4)
failures to report methodology and outcomes of interest; and (5) provision
of research reports that are biased or unusable in practice.207 Although it is
a strength to include experimentation and appropriate evaluation funds in
government programming, poorly planned and poorly executed evaluations
are subject to the same categories of waste. Evaluations subject to the
sources of bias discussed above are unable to contribute results of relevance
for future decision-making, and the results of poorly executed evaluations
are likely to be misleading, leading to costly errors in future decisions.
Sham EBPM is likely to be even more costly. The different categories of
sham EBPM (technical breakdowns, evidence distortion, terminal
experimentation, and ratcheting) have different origins and somewhat
different effects. But each of them leads to a similar problem: inefficient
allocation of governmental resources, with adverse consequences for both
expenditures and public impact of government choices. Simply, decisionmaking procedures are unlikely to reach good results when they omit
evidence, neglect evidence selectively, play up uncertainty to do nothing, or
use evidence disingenuously to ratchet according to policy preferences. In
205. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MEDICAID DEMONSTRATIONS, supra note 165.
206. Chalmers & Glasziou, supra note 167; John P. A. Ioannidis et al., Increasing
Value and Reducing Waste in Research Design, Conduct, and Analysis, 383
LANCET 166 (2014).
207. Chalmers & Glasziou, supra note 167.
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the three prior categories, inefficiency is likely the result of evidence that
might points toward more effective or efficient means of accomplishing
governmental goals being neglected. In the case of ratcheting, the uses of
evidence to cut programming leads to reduced governmental expenditures,
but the loss of effective programming may lead to outsized public harms;
the uses of evidence to expand ineffective programming leads to increased
expense with little benefit.
Of course, “inefficient” decisions may sometimes be correct when they
reflect values that supersede cost-benefit concerns.208 Here, however, it
matters that evidence-based decisions take as their starting premise the
purpose of the policy: given the goal of the policy or program, what is the
most effective choice? Competing values properly factor into the goal, and
not simply the cost-benefit calculus in comparing different policy options.
Choosing a more expensive program for, say, dignitary reasons (as above)
is not a rationale for an inefficient decision—it is instead a means of locating
the most effective choice to fulfill policy goals including the promotion of
dignity. These values-based choices, consequently, are not departures from
EBPM. Decisions that neglect or distort empirical evidence of benefit and
harm, however, are troubling because they are more likely to lead to
fruitless spending, missed opportunities to improve people’s lives, and
sometimes outright harm.
B. Shallow Signaling and Scientific Legitimacy
In addition to undermining policy ends, broken experimentation and
sham EBPM also benefit unfairly from free-riding on scientific legitimacy.
The misuse of evidence in policy, however, can contribute to the erosion of
that legitimacy over time. Evidence distortion and the erosion of scientific
legitimacy are distinct harms—the former amplifies the inefficiency and
social hazards of policies that neglect evidence, while the latter inflicts
independent injury on public confidence in empirical evidence and the
utility of science. Ultimately, the instrumental effects of lost public
confidence in empirical evidence are likely to be more waste and missed
opportunities for promoting the public good.

208. Supra Section I.B (describing how values such as dignity and equity can
elude cost-benefit analysis).
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1. Free-Riding
Beliefs about the value and purpose of science, including social science,
are largely positive. In a 2016 national survey, public trust in science and
scientists was strong and has been fairly stable since the 1970s. 209 When an
agency administrator or legislator seeks to persuade others of the virtues of
a particular policy choice, they can free-ride on scientific legitimacy by using
the language of scientific evidence. EBPM includes two types of
communications: describing the empirical evidence for a decision, and
offering to subject the program or policy to an evaluation. Both
communications are expressive, and both communicate more than simply
the fact of evidence, or the fact of wanting to do an evaluation. Given popular
beliefs about the legitimacy and intentions of empirical research, these
statements also reveal information about the intentions, good faith, and
political posture of the legislator or administrator herself, and these are
likely to generate political support for her position. When the legislator or
administrator is in fact practicing sham EBPM, however, she is free-riding
on scientific legitimacy—the legitimacy halo is undeserved.
Communicating the empirical evidence underlying a policy choice is in
part an expression of the values of the decision-maker. By engaging with
evidence, the decision-maker demonstrates to others that she is not purely
concerned with political ends—she values the impact of the decision on the
public, and (impliedly) she would adjust her choice if the evidence were
different. She communicates that she values the goal of the policy as against
other ends, and she also signals in part that the policy is contingent on its
continued performance. She communicates that the policy is feasible, or at
least sufficiently reasonable to have been tested before, and a good-faith
belief that the policy will work as intended. She also communicates a set of
personal characteristics that includes open-mindedness to others’
knowledge (albeit here, limited to experts), which is politically desirable for
policy-makers expected to serve a constituency. Finally, she implies her own
personal ability to understand the methods and results of the studies she
cites.

209. Trust in science on particular issues, however, varies depending on people’s
prior beliefs on issues such as vaccines, climate change, and genetically
modified foods; on each of these issues, scientists were rated as somewhat
less trustworthy. Cary Funk, Mixed Messages About Public Trust in Science,
PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 8, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/
2017/12/08/mixed-messages-about-public-trust-in-science
[https://perma.cc/4DDK-EUKX].
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Scientific legitimacy also extends to the intention to evaluate one’s
choices, and policy-makers who seek to subject their own programs to
evaluation are similarly communicating with both instrumental and
expressive effect. Taking an agnostic view of the policy ends, the act of
evaluation communicates information about the decision-maker’s
priorities, her views of the participants subject to the experiment, her
commitment and good-faith rationale for selecting the policy under study,
and her tentative commitment to the policy over time. In other words,
proposing experimentation sends signals to policy advocates and
opponents, the individuals subject to the provisional rule or program, and
current and future administrations responsible for implementing and
continuing to enforce the new rules. Evaluating a program also signals that
it is temporary, or contingent, and therefore less threatening to opponents
than a permanent policy choice. Opponents will anticipate an opportunity,
that is, to parse the evidence and to argue against the program on empirical
grounds later, and this expected opportunity can lower the stakes of the
current debate. Even when the evaluation is purely an idea, the policy
position may gain a legitimacy bump when its sponsors propose an
attendant evaluation.
These signals are politically useful. Popular beliefs about the value and
virtue of science can help policy-makers achieve consensus on their ideas—
either because those ideas are backed by science or because they will be
subjected to an evaluation later. In the case of broken experimentation and
sham EBPM, however, these signals are shallow if not entirely hollow, and
they cultivate political capital and credibility where it should be absent. This
can build political momentum for (or decrease opposition against) policies
that are wasteful, ineffective, or harmful, amplifying these harms.
2. Erosion of Scientific Legitimacy
Broken experimentation and sham EBPM are parasitic on scientific
integrity, and in true parasitic form, they also act to undermine it. Public
observers are not privy to the full scope of empirical evidence available for
policy choices, and most observers do not have the time and resources
needed to obtain and appraise the evidence themselves. People who
experience the ineffective or harmful effects of policies touted as “evidencebased” will have reason to suspect that the science is biased in a way that
neglects their interests or unreliable at best. Over time, people unhappy
with “evidence-based” programming may come to doubt either the
credibility of science itself, or the credibility of the legislative and agency
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actors who purport to use evidence in their decisions. 210 Even for those who
agree that empirical research generally is valuable, uncertainty about the
credibility of the decision-makers who cite evidence may lead to skepticism
of all “science-based” claims as disingenuous efforts to free-ride on scientific
authority. This can depress the value of appeals to science in general,
making it more difficult to practice genuine evidence-based practice. Where
sham EBPM abounds, people are inundated with empty or contradicting
claims about science, and they may come to disengage from this form of
persuasion. Note that again, this is true even where people retain a basic
trust in science—if they distrust the ability of decision-makers to deploy
science accurately, then appeals based on scientific legitimacy will be
dulled, making it more difficult for legitimate EBPM (and legitimate uses of
science) to gain needed support.
C. Chilling Scientific Production of Knowledge
Sham EBPM—particularly evidence distortion and ratcheting—can also
have a chilling effect on the production of scientific knowledge. Researchers
grow invested in the well-being of the populations they study, or enter
research in the hopes of improving outcomes for a group or community.
Ratcheting poses long-term threats to funding priorities that work to
benefit communities (most often policies for welfare and safety net
programming), and researchers who fear ratcheting may be unwilling to
expose negative or null program effects for fear of undermining all
resources.
Researchers may seek to guard against this; for example, a recent book
on state-by-state inequalities in Medicaid programming contains a
disclaimer urging, in italics, that nothing in the book should be construed to
support cuts to Medicaid programming.211 Researchers of the Earned
Income Tax Credit perceive numerous ways in which the program is too
limited to support populations who are very poor, 212 but we might hesitate

210. Of course, if people only believe the evidence that supports their own
position, then they will be suspicious of invocations of evidence any time a
policy decision runs counter to their values.
211. JAMILA MICHENER, FRAGMENTED DEMOCRACY: MEDICAID, FEDERALISM, AND UNEQUAL
POLITICS (2018).
212. See, e.g., Anne Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, 73 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 285, 288 (2010) (describing limitations of the EITC program, but also
noting that “progressive praise for the EITC may reflect the political
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to call for its repeal if it will not be replaced with a more effective solution.
But besides communicating their reservations about how their research
should (and should not) be used, researchers have very little control of how
their results will be distorted or used in decision-making.213 It may be no
accident, therefore, that evaluations of meaningful governmental programs
shy away from methodologically rigorous studies that provide robust
evidence of effects. Separating budget allocations on priorities from
allocations on specific program approaches could help to avoid these
perverse incentives.
D. Governmental Citizens as Human Subjects
Broken experimentation and sham EBPM pose another set of hazards,
namely concerns about the ethics of enrolling subjects in futile evaluations.
When government-led studies have little payoff—either because they are
poorly designed or because the results are highly likely to be neglected or
misused in practice—continuing these studies raises ethical questions
about enrolling human subjects. Program and policy evaluations
themselves (as distinct from policy choices made on the basis of that
evidence) may not make subjects worse off than they were before enrolling.
But evaluations do burden subjects, and if these burdens cannot be justified
by social benefit, these studies may be ethically suspect. This is of particular
concern when the experimenter is in fact the government, which exerts
multiple forms of coercive power over citizens, exists primarily to promote
the long-term well-being and flourishing of its citizens, and enjoys
exemptions from some research regulations.214

assumption that a modest wage subsidy is the best that U.S. politics can
produce for low-wage workers”).
213. “On matters of deep controversy, research findings are more likely to be
mobilised as arrows in the battle of ideas, and sometimes in ways that the
original authors may find distasteful.” Head, supra note 23, at 84.
214. Under a change made during the Reagan administration, research subject to
an agency head that is designed to evaluate public benefits programs is
exempt from IRB review. To What Does this Policy Apply, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101
(2018); Sara Rosenbaum, Weakening Medicaid from Within, THE AM. PROSPECT
(Oct. 19, 2017), http://prospect.org/article/weakening-medicaid-within
[https://perma.cc/7FAQ-L2HH].
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1. Research Lacking Practical Benefits
Research that lacks a practical benefit is categorically unethical under
many sources of guidance for research ethics, including the Nuremburg
Code,215 the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences
guidelines,216 the Declaration of Helsinki,217 and the Belmont Report (the
primary source of guidance in the US).218 The rationale for this is threefold.
First, research of little benefit is more likely to provide an inequitable
balance of benefits and burdens. The Belmont Report (and other guidance
documents, including the set of federal regulations known as the Common
Rule) requires a balancing of the benefits and burdens of research.
Participation imposes burdens, even if they are extremely minimal (e.g., a
very small risk of a loss of confidentiality, temporary discomfort, or time).
Where researchers know in advance that research poses no benefit due to
sham EBPM—because it will be misused or neglected, or because it is so
deficiently designed that it cannot provide reliable data—then the burdens
are likely to outweigh the benefits, tipping the balance closer to unethical
research.
Second, individuals who enroll in research (where they do so actively,
as compared to simply being followed through administrative data) expect
that the study will contribute to knowledge. They may participate for other
reasons (e.g., financial incentives, a misconception that research is in fact
treatment, or in-kind benefits of participation), but the expectation of
contributing to knowledge is a constant, and it becomes part of the
“covenant” that researchers and subjects make in the process of informed

215. The Nuremberg Code (1947), 313 BRIT. MED. J. 1448 (1996).
216. Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS),
International Ethical Guidelines for Health-Related Research Involving
Humans (2016).
217. World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki (2013), available at
https://www.wma.net/policies-post/wma-declaration-of-helsinki-ethicalprinciples-for-medical-research-involving-human-subjects
[https://perma.cc/YW7D-2VEP].
218. NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RES., THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1978), https://
www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/belmont-report/index.html
[https://perma.cc/BBP6-L66C].
205

YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW

38 : 150

2019

consent.219 Where researchers fail to publish or disseminate their results—
either because they choose not to do so, or because the results are somehow
barred from release—they fail to fulfill the promise that subjects’ study
participation will contribute to knowledge, thereby undoing the bargain
they made with participants.220 It is of course possible that researchers may
publish their findings in good faith, but those findings may be neglected or
misused in subsequent policy choices. This happens all the time. But where
it is known in advance that the evidence is likely to be distorted, misused, or
silenced, or used for ratcheting, it complicates the ethical balancing and
should factor into the disclosures that researchers make to subjects in these
studies.
Third, the barrier to research that lacks social benefit reflects a concern
about policing the boundaries of ethically (and therefore legally) acceptable
research. Even if research subjects knew that the results of studies were
unlikely to make an impact, or that the study was designed poorly, they may
yet consent to take part in the project. But experimentation—particularly
medical and governmental research221—has an ugly history of abuses in the
U.S., in service of not only knowledge, but also the prestige and position of
researchers. Enrolling subjects in wasted research may exacerbate mistrust
of research among U.S. populations that have borne a disproportionate
share of these abuses, namely populations that are poor and populations of
color. Government-sponsored research with little prospect of social value is
especially sensitive in this larger context of government mistrust and
experimentation—particularly if the results are later used for ratcheting in
ways that harm funding priorities for these groups.
How much practical benefit is necessary? Most research ethics guidance
allows wide latitude in determining that research is beneficial. Value could
derive from testing programs to identify immediate benefits in health or
welfare, from gaining a better understanding of the causes of problems, or

219. Kay Dickersin & Drummond Rennie, Registering Clinical Trials, 290 JAMA
516 (2003).
220. Howard Mann, Research Ethics Committees and Public Dissemination of
Clinical Trial Results, 360 LANCET 406 (2002); Richard S. Saver, Medical
Research and Intangible Harm, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 941 (2006); Anna
Mastroianni & Jeffrey Kahn, Swinging on the Pendulum: Shifting Views of
Justice in Human Subjects Research, 31 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 21 (2001).
221. For an introduction to unethical and abusive research practices in the United
States, see HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID (2008).
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from developing new hypotheses about possible program approaches.222
Assuming a sound research design and public reporting of findings,
evaluations that are neglected by regulators and legislators may
nonetheless yield important findings that can be used to shape advocacy
efforts or enable variations in programs that are decentralized. But where
evaluation designs are unsound, or where results are likely to be distorted
or used for ratcheting in ways that disadvantage the research participant
populations, the ethical benefits of experimentation are unclear and
deserve close attention.
Currently there is little oversight over whether research poses social
benefits. Federal regulations of human subjects have delegated
responsibility for scrutinizing research protocols to institutional review
boards (IRBs). IRBs are generally instructed not to consider the long-term
consequences of research during protocol review; the Common Rule in fact
directs that “in evaluating risks and benefits, the IRB . . . should not consider
possible long-range effects of applying knowledge gained in the research
(for example, the possible effects of the research on public policy) as among
those risks that fall within the purview of its responsibility.” 223 But IRBs do,
in fact, often consider social implications of research findings despite this
rule.224 Some have suggested that this is the proper purview of research
advisory committees instead.225 But in the main, it is currently up to
individual researchers and funders to consider the potential impacts of
their research, including the chance that it will exert little effect on policy,
or the chance that it will be used for outsized purposes that harm the
constituencies in the research population. In areas that are susceptible to
sham EBPM, ensuring rigorous research designs and public availability of
research results will enable some of the positive externalities described
below, even if the findings are ignored or misused at the governmental level.

222. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., What Makes Clinical Research Ethical?, 283 JAMA
2701 (2000).
223. Criteria for IRB Approval of Research, 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2018).
224. Alan Fleishman et al., Dealing with the Long-Term social Implications of
Research, 11 AM. J. BIOETHICS 5 (2011); Robert Klitzman, How IRBs View and
Make Decisions About Social Risks, 8 J. EMPIRICAL RES. HUM. RES. ETHICS 58
(2013).
225. Id.
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2. The Government as Experimenter
When the government is acting as experimenter, either by itself or by
contracting with researchers, the ethical basis for experimentation may
deserve special scrutiny. Compared to other institutions that conduct and
sponsor research, the government possesses greater coercive authority, as
well as greater structural obligations to promote the well-being of citizens
generally, including those who become research subjects. In some research
contexts, our faith that the government will carry out its role to safeguard
citizens’ well-being is the basis for wholesale exemptions from independent
ethical review of research designs.
The clearest example of this is an exemption embedded as part of the
“Common Rule,” the federal regulations providing for institutional review
board (IRB) oversight of research with human subjects. 226 In 1983, the
Reagan Administration sought to grant a series of Medicaid waivers through
§ 1115 of the Social Security Act, which allows states a five-year exemption
from certain federal regulations in order to implement experimental
Medicaid and cash welfare (then AFDC) programming. At the time, the
waivers intended to test methods of cost-sharing among the Medicaid
population, and were framed in terms of making the programs financially
sustainable.227 The Carter administration had required separate IRB review
for experimental Medicaid waivers, but Reagan’s HHS quickly reversed this
policy. Shortly after the change of administration, HHS implemented
changes to the Common Rule with immediate effect,228 then issued rules
specifying that IRB approval would be duplicative and unnecessary for §
1115 waivers. Instead, agency personnel would consider ethics concerns as
part of the waiver approval process, which rests on whether a waiver is
“likely to advance the purposes” of the Medicaid statute.229 As the
administration noted, “ethical and other research problems raised by
226. To What Does this Policy Apply, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2018).
227. Waiver of Requirements as Applied to Medicaid Demonstration Projects
Involving Cost-Sharing (Copayments, Deductibles, Coinsurance), 47 Fed. Reg.
9208 (Mar. 4, 1982).
228. Id.
229. Exemption of Certain Research and Demonstration Projects from
Regulations for Protection of Human Research Subjects, 48 Fed. Reg. 9266
(Mar. 4, 1983); see also Lucy A. Williams, The Abuse of Section 1115 Waivers:
Welfare Reform in Search of a Standard, 12 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 8 (1994); Sara
Rosenbaum, Mothers and Children Last: The Oregon Medicaid Experiment, 18
AM. J.L. & MED. 97 (1992).
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research in benefits programs will be addressed by the officials who are
familiar with the programs.”230 Recent updates to the Common Rule in
January 2017 have retained and clarified this exemption from IRB review
“in order to make it plain that such research projects on public benefit or
service programs [under § 1115 of the Social Security Act] qualify for the
exemption.” 231
Separately, a 1992 statutory requirement also specifies that HHS funds
may not be used to support research that “poses a danger to the physical,
mental, or emotional well-being of a participant without the participant’s
informed consent,” 232 and agencies considering public benefits experiments
must evaluate research according to this standard. In interpreting the
language of the Common Rule, the Ninth Circuit’s 1994 opinion in Beno v.
Shalala (along with other courts who have considered the issue) has not
challenged the exemption of agency-approved public benefits research
from IRB review. Instead, the court noted that the Secretary of HHS was
required to “make some determination that a project does not pose
unnecessary risks to human subjects” as part of waiver approval, including
considering welfare recipients’ objections to proposed waiver plans.
This exemption from IRB review is a departure from ordinary practice
for research ethics, but reflects the view that government will seek to
prioritize the well-being of the populations it serves, including those that it
enrolls in experimental programming and evaluations thereof. Here, the
risks to subjects may arise not only from those inherent to the program, but
also from how decision-makers are likely to use the evidence produced.
Where research is so poorly designed as to be inconclusive, or where it is
likely to be used disingenuously for ratcheting or distortion, the ethical
basis for this research may be suspect, and it is particularly relevant when
the government itself is the party experimenting.
E. Positive Externalities
Sham EBPM and broken experimentation have little direct benefit, but
they may have silver linings. Here I consider the potential benefits that may
arise from even minimal efforts to use and produce evidence, despite the

230. 48 Fed. Reg. 9268; Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057 (1994).
231. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149, 7195
(Jan 19, 2017).
232. Prohibition on Funding Certain Experiments Involving Human Participants,
42 U.S.C. § 3515b (2018).
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fact that evidence may be largely neglected or misused by legislators or
regulators making the primary decision.
1. Collateral EBPM
Although the forms of sham EBPM differ, all involve the framing of
policy decisions as justified by research evidence. Citing research evidence
to justify governmental choices—rather than, say, justifying those choices
in terms of pure values or political economy—may in theory promote EBPM
by other entities, including more genuine versions. This may happen in
several ways.
First, articulating policy choices on empirical grounds—even if those
grounds are misconstrued—may have the salutary, inadvertent benefit of
signaling to other decision-makers that it is desirable to make policy
decisions on the basis of empirical research. This could, of course, lead to
the proliferation of sham EBPM practices (a negative externality). A greater
prevalence of policies justified as “evidence-based,” however, may
encourage some observers to engage more fully with research evidence in
their own decision-making, including observers who do so effectively and
in good faith.
Second, sham EBPM practices may invite political rebuttals that
publicize a more faithful depiction of empirical evidence, enabling EBPM
elsewhere. For example, an attempt to justify public spending on “Scared
Straight” programming for preventing juvenile offending may be couched in
terms of anecdotal evidence (perhaps evidence from a hit TV show). 233 But
this would mischaracterize the evidence base for Scared Straight
programming, which has been shown in multiple randomized studies to
exacerbate rather than deter juvenile offending. 234 The continued use of
Scared Straight programming on the basis of flimsy evidence has drawn
public attention, with broader dissemination of accurate information about
research findings.235 These public correctives may publicize evidence that

233. See, e.g., Andy Denhart, Beyond Scared Straight’s Real-Life Controversy, DAILY
BEAST (Jul. 13, 2017) https://www.thedailybeast.com/beyond-scaredstraights-real-life-controversy [https://perma.cc/ZP54-SEHB].
234. Petrosino et al., Scared Straight and Other Juvenile Awareness Programs for
Preventing Juvenile Delinquency: A Systematic Review, 9 CAMP. SYS. REV. 1
(2013).
235. See, e.g., Gary Van Landingham, Evidence Trumps Anecdote for “Scared
Straight” Programs, PEW (Oct. 14, 2015) https://www.pewtrusts.org/
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would not otherwise be brought to light, enabling more evidence-informed
decisions elsewhere or at future points in time. Decision-makers who couch
bad decisions in evidence-based terms invite a response on the basis of that
evidence, which may add motivation for subsequent reform (or perhaps
momentum for replacement of the decision-makers).
2. The Hawthorne Effect
Programs may function better simply because they are being observed,
regardless of what happens to the evaluation. The marginal improvement
in program effectiveness by virtue of being observed is reflective of the
Hawthorne effect,236 also known as observation bias. The first studies of this
dynamic were among employees of a telephone manufacturing factory, who
produced more under intensive monitoring compared to when they were
more loosely supervised; modern studies continue to find support for the
proposition that participating in research can improve outcomes.237
Rationales for the mechanism often include social desirability bias among
program participants,238 but in evaluations of social programs, concern
among program staff over ongoing funding may be a more powerful
explanation. Those who implement government-funded programs have an
incentive to deliver higher-quality programming in the presence of an
evaluation, given that the findings may be used to inform funding and
implementation decisions. This may improve outcomes for people enrolled
in an evaluation, even if the study is poorly conducted and even if the results
are never used.

en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/10/14/evidence-trumpsanecdote-for-scared-straight-programs [https://perma.cc/9KNT-MGM7];
Denhart, supra note 233; Scared Straight, WASHINGTON STATE INSTITUTE FOR
PUBLIC POLICY (2018) http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/BenefitCost/Program/114
[https://perma.cc/85P9-HZ2V].
236. Rob McCarney et al., The Hawthorne Effect: A Randomised, Controlled Trial, 7
BMC RES. METHODOLOGY 30 (2007); Jim McCambridge et al., Systematic Review
of the Hawthorne Effect: New Concepts Are Needed to Study Research
Participation Effects, 67 J. CLIN. EPIDEMIOLOGY 247 (2014).
237. McCambridge et al., supra note 236, at 271.
238. Id.
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3. Clarifying Values
Misuses of evidence may actually have a useful instructive function:
they teach us where evidence may not be the right means, or right set of
arguments, for deciding a particular policy. Where evidence exists but is
neglected, it is a signal that evidence-based reasoning is perceived to be
inappropriate for the problem; the problem is one of values, and perhaps
cannot be resolved through a technocratic approach of identifying the most
effective policy choice.
Even when decisions are exclusively driven by values, however,
experimentation may assist current policy development by clarifying the
stakes of those choices. Programs may not work as intended, or they may
have important externalities that matter and implicate values that come in
tension with policy goals. Identifying those externalities is an important
benefit of evaluations, and may arise even from evaluations that are of low
methodological quality. Say, for instance, a legislator is in favor of criminal
penalties for people who expose others to HIV without disclosure, but is also
opposed to inequality on the basis of race and gender. Studies of HIVspecific criminal statutes showing disproportionate effects on populations
of women and people of color can illuminate the stakes of the policy choice,
even if the study isn’t the primary basis of the legislative decision.239 The
decision may yet be based entirely on values—namely, the comparative
value the legislator places on equity compared to her preference for
deterring HIV transmission—but she may not have recognized the values
conflict without research results. Like collateral EBPM, this function is more
clearly served by good evaluation designs, but even methodologically weak
studies may provide relevant evidence to frame the values at stake in policy
discussions.
IV. PROMOTING AND PRESERVING EVIDENCE-BASED EFFORTS
The prior Parts have considered the pathologies that ensue when efforts
to generate and use evidence fall so far short of the ideal that they are better
considered sham practices. Despite some positive externalities, broken
239. Y. Tony Yang & Kristen Underhill, Rethinking Criminalization of HIV Exposure
– Lessons from California’s New Legislation, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1174
(2018); Amira Hasenbush et al., HIV Criminalization in California: Penal
Implications for People Living with HIV/AIDS, WILLIAMS INST. (DEC. 2015),
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/health-and-hiv-aids/hivcriminalization-in-california-penal-implications-for-people-living-withhivaids/ [https://perma.cc/JJ49-5VDG].
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experimentation and sham EBPM may do more harm than good. The
pathologies of sham EBPM can undermine scientific legitimacy, chill
rigorous research, spend limited governmental funds on ineffective
programming (or, in ratcheting, culminate in cutting entire categories of
programming that may in fact have social benefits), threaten the balance of
benefits and burdens imposed on research subjects, and ultimately result in
inefficient uses of public resources with consequences for well-being.
Against this background, I here aim to generate strategies that might
promote genuine engagement with EBPM and experiments to evaluate
policy decisions. These present both legal and practical means to bolster
careful and rigorous uses of evidence and to minimize sham EBPM, broken
experimentation, and attendant harms. There is little, in fact, to be done to
avoid sham EBPM in areas of highly contested values, but efforts to
maximize evaluation quality can (and should) take center stage. Where
values are more aligned, steps to promote EBPM through ex ante policy
commitments, evaluation mandates, and evaluation transparency hold
some promise. The focus herein will be on actions available to government
actors, rather than private actors, although private entities may also seek to
shape evidence-based policy development.
A. Terms of Engagement: The Limits of EBPM and Experimentation
Where decisions rest on fundamental values that are not shared, EBPM
will do little; for these areas of policy choices, the risks of sham EBPM are
high. Recall the difference between abortion politics and tornado politics
above; although state legislative restrictions on abortion are increasingly
couched in the language of empirical evidence and women’s health, these
engage only tenuously with evidence on the health consequences of making
abortion more inaccessible.240 Evidence-based policy-making is unlikely in
a space where values are so contested. In recent decades, the U.S. has
experienced increased polarization characterized by greater ideological
distance between partisans and greater mutual dislike between
partisans.241 New issues have also gained attention from the left and

240. CAROL SANGER, ABOUT ABORTION: TERMINATING PREGNANCY IN TWENTY-FIRSTCENTURY AMERICA (2017).
241. Yphtach Lelkes, Mass Polarization: Manifestations and Measurements, 80 PUB.
OPINION Q. 391 (2016); see also Liliana Mason, Ideologues without Issues: The
Polarizing Consequences of Ideological Identities, 82 PUB. OPINION Q. 866
(2018) (describing antipathy between Democrats and Republicans in terms
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resistance from the right in many countries—including environmentalism,
access to health care, and a greater focus on rights for women, people of
color, and sexual minority groups. 242 In this environment, many issues now
verge closer to abortion politics than to tornado politics, characterized by
strong and divergent beliefs in what “the evidence” shows.
In a 2011 article describing law as a species of politics, Jeffrey Rachlinski
notes why “evidence-based law” is likely to remain an unrealized ideal:
[B]eliefs are important to people and are resilient . . . . [P]eople who
support the death penalty nearly uniformly believe that it deters
crime. They also tend to believe that gun ownership makes society
safer, that abortion should be illegal . . . and that climate change is
not a serious problem . . . . The lack of shared goals means that many
studies are essentially irrelevant to underlying legal policy . . . .
People interpret social science evidence in ways that are consistent
with their beliefs, embracing work that supports them and rejecting
work that does not. 243
Others have commented on the difficulty in reasoning on the basis of
empirical evidence where there are fundamental underlying disputes about
values.244 In family law, for example, Claire Huntington notes that the
consideration of evidence will be counterproductive without a shared
agreement on values; in education law, Eloise Pasachoff notes that the Every
Student Succeeds Act (ESSA)—which requires states to base educational
reform activities on “evidence”—will do little where there is disagreement
on what the purposes of education should be.245
Areas of highly contested values are inhospitable to evidence. The
problems of bounded rationality of policy-makers are amplified in these
settings, and ineluctable boundaries on scientific objectivity, capacity to
measure meaningful values, and scientific authority provide valuable
of identity, rather than disputes about particular issues). Even where there
may be common ground in policy preferences, ingroup and outgroup
identities and mutual resentment may complicate compromise).
242. See, e.g., ALEJANDRO MORENO, POLITICAL CLEAVAGES: ISSUES, PARTIES, AND THE
CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY (2019).
243. Jeffery J. Rachlinski, Evidence-Based Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 921-22
(2011).
244. Eloise Pasachoff, Two Cheers for Evidence: Law, Research, and Values in
Education Policymaking and Beyond, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1933 (2017); see also
Huntington, supra note 171.
245. Pasachoff, supra note 244.
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materials for motivated political actors. These are prime conditions for
evidence distortion, terminal experimentation, and ratcheting, as well as
technical breakdowns resulting from motivated interpretations of evidence.
Empirical evidence itself is unlikely to change the outcomes of these
decisions; such policy choices, particularly in highly visible legislative and
regulatory decisions, are made for political reasons and are better explained
(and argued) in political economy terms. In the case of ratcheting cuts to
after-school programs, for example, “[t]he Trump Administration is not
going to be convinced to fund afterschool programs with a data dump of
studies showing that the programs are successful. Instead, if the
Administration changes its position on whether to fund a given program, it
will be due to voters’ moral outrage.”246 The Congress that banned further
study of Upward Bound programming would not have reallocated funding
after another study showing lack of effect; that was a values-driven decision
about funding priorities, made on the basis of political rather than
evidentiary concerns.
As a practical matter, what should be done to guard against sham EBPM
in these areas? There is little hope of salvaging EBPM where values are
highly discordant. Legislative mandates to consider and apply evidence,
such as ESSA, are likely to culminate in a values-motivated reading of
evidence that reinforces legislators’ existing positions. But although there is
little to do about sham EBPM where values are divergent, it may be more
feasible to promote evaluation quality. Where evaluations of policy
innovations are done in highly contested areas, the stakes are higher for
rigorous designs that minimize bias. This entails independent evaluators,
randomization where practicable, statistical power to detect small changes,
transparency of evaluation methods, and public release of evaluation
findings to enable others besides the primary policy-makers to use the
findings. Where evidence is generated on hotly contested policy decisions,
particularly evidence from government-mandated or governmentsponsored evaluations, ensuring that the study is robust will minimize (but
not avoid) sham EBPM. Researchers embarking on these studies should
consider the ethical balance of harms and potential benefits, given the
possibility for results to be distorted in ways that disadvantage the
populations under study. Publicity of findings is critical given that the
benefits of such studies are likely to be in their externalities (collateral
EBPM), rather than in their primary impact on policy.
In areas more akin to tornado politics, the decision-making
environment may be more hospitable to evidence-based decision-making.

246. Id. at 1969.
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EBPM may be more useful for some areas of decision-making than others,
even in areas where values diverge. When there is a shared view that a
problem exists, evidence can identify the scope and causes thereof
(although causes are more controversial than scope). When there is shared
agreement on a set of appropriate and politically palatable solutions to a
problem, evidence can identify the feasibility and likely effectiveness of
solutions in that set. There may also be a divergence in policy views, but
shared trust in a research design. Where this occurs, evaluation may work
as a tiebreaker or a form of dispute resolution. 247 In these areas, those
tasked with making policy choices may be more comfortable engaging in ex
ante commitments, mandating robust evaluations, or making ex post
disclosures about the evidence base for their decisions.
B. Ex Ante Commitments
In areas where EBPM is feasible, one way to avoid sham versions is to
ask decision-makers to make ex ante commitments to take action on the
basis of evaluation results. That is, legislators or regulators could agree to
policies on a trial basis with an evaluation attached. But before the
evaluation takes place, they could publicly state their planned future course
of action depending on what the results show (including, perhaps, plans to
do nothing because they prefer to decide on the basis of values rather than
evidence). These statements need not be binding to be useful; nonbinding
statements can also call attention to choices that depart from ex ante plans.
But a binding pre-commitment of support based on the results of program
evaluation would be one mechanism to ensure greater engagement in
EBPM, with less interference from political concerns. Ex ante commitments
to EBPM may also alleviate some of the problems with bounded rationality
of policy-makers by encouraging greater ex ante engagement with research
methods and designs.
A range of ex ante commitments may be useful. A simple commitment
may be a choice to avoid ratcheting. Before an evaluation begins, legislators
may publicly promise that they will not use the results of the evaluation to
247. Others have considered the capacity for randomized trials to act as a
tiebreaker between adversaries who agree on the rigor of the research
design: “When robustness considerations are motivated by an adversarial
audience with non-common priors, randomization can be interpreted as a
way to let parties with diverging priors agree on a process.” Abhijit Banerjee
et al., A Theory of Experimenters 19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working
Paper No. 23867, 2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w23867
[https://perma.cc/6M4Q-EQ74].
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change funding appropriations for the entire policy goal. For example, if
Congress decides to earmark federal funds for substance use disorder (SUD)
treatment with an evaluation of funded programs, they may publicly
promise that they will not use the results of any particular program
evaluation to cut funding from SUD treatment. They would, however, retain
the ability to reallocate funds to different approaches within that category
as the evidence warranted. Although this would not foreclose the allocation
of funds within the funding category on the basis of values rather than
evidence (consider, for example, a reallocation of funds to increased
prosecution of drug crimes instead of medication-assisted treatment), it
would avoid the more general problem of defunding entire categories of
expenditure. This would alleviate some concerns about chilling research, as
well as some of the ethical concerns about doing research that presents the
possibility of reducing resources for the populations involved.
Another ex ante commitment is a decision to impose set timelines for
renewing specific program approaches (within program categories, which
is different from sunsetting an entire category of expenditures), but with the
public commitment to review the results of program evaluations at a set
time before renewal. This could even include a public declaration of what
outcomes would factor into the renewal decision or a stated presumption of
renewal (with a specification of what types of evidence would overcome the
presumption). Although this would not eliminate sham EBPM (terminal
experimentation may be a continued concern, as would evidence distortion
if the choices turn out to be more values-based than evidence-based), it
would also create the infrastructure and opportunity for genuine EBPM for
decisions that are less controversial.
It is also possible to imagine ex ante, pre-evaluation agreements about
the types of disclosures that should be made to program participants or
their communities. For example, legislators may agree ex ante that if an
evaluation finds a program to be ineffective for its stated purpose (e.g., a
school voucher program does not produce improvements in educational
outcomes), that program should be required to disclose the results of the
evaluation to new program participants.248
Finally, ex ante commitments could in theory entail promises to support
(or to withhold support from) a policy or program depending on evaluation
results. This would, essentially, entail presumptive voting on the basis of
evidence that is yet to be generated. For example, a provision of the
Affordable Care Act allows insurance companies to charge smokers 150%

248. This is far softer than de-funding programs, but the effects of disclosure are
unpredictable and would need further study.
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of the premiums charged to nonsmokers in the individual markets.249
Congress could in theory remove this flexibility and require equivalent
premiums for smokers, given preliminary reports that the rule has led to
reduced insurance coverage for smokers but no reduction in smoking
behavior itself.250 If Congress did so, individual legislators may publicly
announce that they will support reinstating the law if smoking increases by
30% or more as a result of repeal (i.e., setting a threshold for a decision
commitment). Or, in a softer version, they might announce that they intend
to change their mind (i.e., setting a presumption), but that they would
consider all evidence when making this decision.
This last category of commitment would be a mixed bag. It would avert
the problem of free-riding on scientific legitimacy, because it would in fact
be a promise to act on the results of the scientific study. It would raise the
stakes for methodologically rigorous and adequately powered evaluations.
For contentious evaluations, those promises could supply decision-makers
with motivation to interfere with evaluations over time. This could also
exacerbate problems of authority given to experts, as well as concerns about
attentiveness to relevant outcomes that matter to constituencies of interest.
These pre-commitments could perhaps spark objections on the theory of
delegating legislative authority to private entities (namely, the researchers
running the evaluation)—making them more defensible as presumptions
rather than enforceable promises about how one will vote. A further
problem arises from making decisions on the basis of one or a few
evaluations in real time, rather than waiting for long-term results or the
aggregation of results from multiple studies.
Individuals in power have little incentive to make pre-commitments
tied to evaluation results—the motivation for these promises would need
to come from political pressure in favor of evidence-based practice or from
the need to make a concession in order to secure other political bargains.
But these are intriguing thought experiments for promoting evidence-based
decisions. Commitments to avoid ratcheting and to consult evidence at
specified intervals may be the most feasible of these proposals, and may go
a little way toward alleviating sham EBPM and broken experimentation in
practice.

249. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1)(A)(iv)
(2018).
250. Abigail S. Friedman et al., Evidence Suggests that the ACA’s Tobacco
Surcharges Reduced Insurance Take-Up and Did Not Increase Smoking
Cessation, 35 HEALTH AFF. 1176 (2016).
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C. Evaluation Mandates
In areas that are more hospitable to EBPM, a salient concern is
maximizing evaluation rigor, such that the evidence generated about those
programs is of high enough quality to enable genuinely evidence-based
choices. Attaching robust and methodologically specific evaluation
mandates to program and policy decisions is one way to promote this goal.
Under the Spending Clause power, Congress has broad latitude to fund and
specify conditions for evaluations of its policy decisions. But to date,
evaluation mandates are rare and chronically non-specific; where
evaluations are required, such as the evaluations of Medicaid experimental
waivers, the approval of specific evaluation protocols is often delegated to
an agency,251 without any parameters set by Congress itself. Imposing more
mandates with greater specificity can improve the quality of evidence
generated, alleviating broken experimentation, and public scrutiny of this
research can mitigate evidence distortion, ratcheting, and terminal
experimentation. Improving research designs can also alleviate some of the
problems of bounded scientific objectivity and bounded rationality of
policy-makers, and greater availability of evidence can support political
participation by groups whose interests are affected.
Congress knows how to specify evaluation designs—and, in fact, the
legislature has demonstrated its ability to bar specific study designs
entirely, as with the DC school voucher study and the Upward Bound
experiments. Because these were disputes based on values, not evidence,
these evaluations may have done little to influence policy. But where EBPM
is more feasible, evaluation mandates can do far more to ensure genuine,
rather than sham, experimentation. Mandates can provide methodological
guidance (e.g., requiring or encouraging randomized approaches), require
the use of independent investigators, require pre-publication of evaluation
protocols and public release of results, specify the need for power
calculations to ensure adequate sample sizes, require the collection of
specific outcomes to ensure attentiveness to a range of relevant outcomes
(and to facilitate research synthesis, such as meta-analyses of comparable
studies), and fund a mix of quantitative and quantitative study approaches
in order to capture unexpected benefits and burdens of the policy or
program. Evaluations mandates can also require the timely release of
evaluation results, such as before program renewal or sunsets take place.
The evaluation mandate for Medicaid § 1115 waivers provides a partial
model. After decades of relative secrecy and weak evaluations, the
251. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MEDICAID DEMONSTRATIONS, supra note 165.
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Affordable Care Act tightened statutory requirements for waiver
evaluations. Although there are no specifications for evaluation designs,
protocols and evaluation timelines must be made publicly available on the
CMS website, along with reports of evaluation results. Evaluations must also
report on specific outcome categories, such as insurance coverage, access to
care, quality of care, and beneficiary satisfaction with the program.252
Additional requirements imposed by CMS in 2014 include the use of
independent evaluators, and CMS has recently issued advisory
recommendations that request rigorous protocols and a mix of qualitative
and qualitative designs.253
Evaluation mandates—and dedicated funding for evaluation
activities—are a feasible strategy to avoid broken experimentation in fields
where evidence is likely to be used, either for primary or collateral EBPM.
Where the existence, methods, and findings of evaluations are made public,
these mandates may also be useful in limiting evidence distortion and
ratcheting, and they may mitigate some of the concerns about bounded
scientific objectivity.
D. Evaluation Transparency, Ex Ante and Ex Post
Even where evaluations are not mandated, an important defense
against broken experimentation is ex ante transparency, including making
evaluation protocols publicly available before the evaluation takes place.
This has several advantages. It usefully exposes designs to the possibility of
public input, which can help to identify secondary outcomes of interest and
potentially catch errors before designs are launched. But more importantly,
it ties researchers to the mast of the evaluation plan. There are many
opportunities for researchers to act on biases when reporting an empirical
study—for example, cherry-picking and reporting only findings with
favorable results, or subgroup comparisons with results in the predicted
directions. Ex ante publication of a study protocol, with intended outcomes
and comparisons, is assurance against biased reporting, and it ensures that
researchers will implement the protocol and report with fidelity to the
original design. Along with evaluation mandates, this transparency can also
help to mitigate evidence distortion, terminal experimentation, and
ratcheting, and it can provide public information to counteract the bounded
rationality of policy-makers and concerns about scientific objectivity.
252. Kristen Underhill et al., Fulfilling States’ Duty to Evaluate Medicaid Waivers,
379 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1985, 1986 (2018).
253. CTR. FOR MEDICAID & MEDICARE, supra note 137.
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This strategy of pre-publication of research protocols arose in medical
research, as a Congressional mandate in 1997. In the Food and Drug
Modernization Act that year, Congress directed the NIH to create a registry
for clinical trials that would be used as part of FDA approval of experimental
drugs for patients with life-threatening conditions. In response, NIH
launched clinicaltrials.gov in 2000. By 2005, most medical journals began to
require all published clinical trials to have pre-registered with
clinicaltrials.gov before submitting manuscripts for publication. The World
Health Organization similarly encouraged trial registration and developed
a means of searching across multiple trial registries in 2007, the same year
in which Congress expanded registration requirements for additional FDA
trials, including publishing trial results on the site.254 Most recently, in July
2018, registration with clinicaltrials.gov or regulations.gov became
mandatory for all clinical trials subject to Common Rule research ethics
oversight.255 Although compliance with clinicaltrials.gov reporting
requirements is incomplete,256 and inconsistent reporting still exists,257
these inconsistencies are comparatively rare; there is widespread
agreement that pre-publication is an imperative means of guarding against
selective reporting and concealment of trial results. 258
Although many evaluations of policies and programs are not
randomized trials, prior publication of government-sponsored evaluations
would help to minimize the problems of broken experimentation. Even for
evaluations that are not themselves mandated, it would be straightforward
to mandate the pre-publication of all government-sponsored evaluation

254. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121
Stat. 823 (2007).
255. History, Policies, and Law, CLINICALTRIALS.GOV, https://clinicaltrials.gov/
ct2/about-site/history [https://perma.cc/KWB8-XZGL].
256. Andrew P. Prayle et al., Compliance with Mandatory Reporting of Clinical Trial
Results on ClinicalTrials.gov: Cross Sectional Study, 344 BMJ, Jan. 3, 2012, at 1;
Joseph S. Ross, Trial Publication After Registration in ClinicalTrials.gov: A
Cross-Sectional Analysis, 6 PLOS MED., Sept. 8, 2009, at 1.
257. Daniel M. Hartung et al., Reporting Discrepancies Between the
ClinicalTrial.gov Results Database and Peer-Reviewed Publication, 160 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 477 (2014); Caroline Riveros et al., Timing and Completeness
of Trial Results Posted at ClinicalTrials.gov and Published in Journals, 10 PLOS
MED., Dec. 3, 2013, at 1; Jessica E. Becker et al., Reporting of Results in
ClinicalTrials.gov and High-Impact Journals, 311 JAMA 1063 (2014).
258. Deborah A. Zarin et al., Update on Trial Registration 11 Years After the ICMJE
Policy Was Established, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 383 (2017).
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protocols, timelines, and outcomes on clinicaltrials.gov or an analogous site.
Subsequent publication of results in the same place would also help serve
the function of releasing findings to the public, facilitating EBPM efforts
where possible, or enabling collateral EBPM or momentum for policy
change where primary policy choices are hostile to evidence. Mandates for
evaluation, whether set by agency rules, legislation, or executive order,
could incorporate transparency language that builds on this approach.
E. Teams of Rivals in Evidence Production
The application of evidence is likely to play out in an adversarial
process, with competing political priorities and interest groups at stake. But
the production of evidence on individual research teams is often less
controversial, which can compound concerns about scientific objectivity.
One strategy that could improve scientific objectivity in the generation of
evidence is adversarial collaboration 259 (also described as proponentskeptic collaboration).260 This approach requires research teams to include
researchers that are ideologically supportive and those that are skeptical of
the policy at hand, on the theory that biases at the two ideological poles will
make methodological choices as rigorous and objective as possible. An
adversarial collaboration model could strengthen rigor at every stage of
evaluation, including designing the study, overseeing the protocol, creating
an external advisory board, producing research reports. This could
contribute to higher-quality research inputs, and it could reduce the
possibility of broken experimentation.
259. See, e.g., Ian Bateman et al., Testing Competing Models of Loss Aversion: An
Adversarial Collaboration, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1561 (2005); Daniel Kahneman,
Experiences of Collaborative Research, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 723, 729 (2003); G.P.
Latham et al., Resolving Scientific Disputes by the Joint Design of Crucial
Experiments by the Antagonists: Application to the Erez-Latham Dispute
Regarding Participation in Goal Setting, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 753 (1988).
Dora Matzke et al., The Effect of Horizontal Eye Movements on Free Recall: A
Preregistered Adversarial Collaboration, 144 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. e1
(2015); Marilyn Schlitz et al., Of Two Minds: Sceptic-Proponent Collaboration
within Parapsychology, 97 BR. J. PSYCHOL. 313 (2006). See also Scott
Alexander, Adversarial Collaboration Contest Results, SLATE STAR CODEX (Sep.
26, 2018), https://slatestarcodex.com/2018/09/26/adversarialcollaboration-contest-results [https://perma.cc/5MTN-4N7X]. I am
especially grateful to participants in the faculty workshop at Northwestern
Law for this suggestion.
260. Nuzzo, supra note 51, at 185.
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F. Judicial Review and Agency Oversight of Evidence-Based Decisions
Judicial review could serve as another means of encouraging more
robust engagement with empirical evidence, particularly for agency
decisions.261 Under the Administrative Procedure Act, agency rulemaking
and adjudicatory decisions are presumed to be reviewable;262 courts must
set aside agency actions determined to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,”263 and must also set
aside formal adjudicatory decisions that are “unsupported by substantial
evidence.”264 Although courts tend to defer to agencies’ interpretations of
their own statutes (reviewed on an arbitrary and capricious standard) 265
and regulations (reviewed for plain error or inconsistency with the
regulation),266 the availability of judicial review is a means of challenging
agency decisions that depart sharply from evidence in the administrative
record.
The standard of review for agency rules is by no means that of “ideal”
EBPM. The bar for a finding of arbitrariness and capriciousness is fairly
high, encompassing actions when the agency “has relied on factors which
Congress had not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that
runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.”267 Courts must not substitute their judgment for that of the
agencies—there must be “a rational connection between the facts found and

261. I am grateful to Matt Spitzer for suggesting the State Farm and Bechtel cases
considered here.
262. APA § 701; see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971).
263. APA § 706(2)(A).
264. APA § 706(2)(E).
265. Chevron v. Nat. Res. Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron deference
is unavailable where an agency either lacks authority delegated by Congress
to make rules in the area, or where the agency is not acting pursuant to its
delegated authority. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
266. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,
325 U.S. 410 (1945).
267. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of U.S., Inc., v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
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the choice made.”268 But within these contours, courts can reach some of the
most egregious instances of ratcheting and evidence distortion.
One such episode was the 1981 decision by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Agency (NHTSA) to rescind an agency rule, previously blessed
in judicial review, that had required automobile manufactures to equip cars
with passive restraints (airbags or passive seatbelts). 269 NHTSA had
established the rule in 1977 during the Carter administration, on the
assumption that a majority of manufacturers would use airbags, but instead
the vast majority of cars were built with seatbelts that could be left
unlatched (thus defeating their safety benefits). Under the Reagan
administration in 1981, NHTSA concluded that the rule was ineffective and
revoked it in its entirety, citing the burdens on the automobile industry. 270
This might be considered an extreme example of ratcheting—because there
was evidence that some consumers did not use the detachable seatbelts that
they had been provided, NHTSA eliminated the mandate for all passive
restraints. But in concluding that the rule would be ineffective, the agency
did not consider two possible alternatives: modifying the rule to require
either nondetachable seatbelts or mandatory installation of airbags. When
a group of automobile insurers sued for review of the rescission, the Court
agreed that it had been arbitrary and capricious. Writing for the majority,
Justice Wright explained that the failure to consider the alternatives
(mandating nondetachable seatbelts or airbags) was a wholesale
abandonment of agency discretion. Where consideration of an obvious
alternative was nonexistent, the decision could not have been “the product
of reasoned decisionmaking.”271
Moreover, when NHTSA sought to emphasize its uncertainty about
whether consumers would choose to use passive seatbelts, the Court noted
that the agency had provided no evidence in support of these doubts:
“Recognizing that policymaking in a complex society must account for
uncertainty . . . does not imply that it is sufficient for an agency to merely
recite the terms ‘substantial uncertainty’ as a justification for its actions. The
268. Id., at 43.
269. Id.
270. Justice Rehnquist’s dissent notes that the decision was likely “related to the
election of a new President of a different political party” with a different
“philosophy” on the issue. For Rehnquist, political change was “a perfectly
reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and
benefits of its programs and regulations,” so long as any change was “within
the boundaries established by Congress.” Id., at 59.
271. Id., at 52.
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agency must explain the evidence which is available.”272 The court notes,
too, that “the empirical evidence on the record . . . reveals more than a
doubling of the usage rate experienced with manual belts.” 273 Without
engaging with this evidence, NHTSA had departed so sharply from an
“evidence-based” decision that it met the high bar for arbitrary and
capricious action.
The State Farm decision leverages the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review in two ways, both of which can bring agency actions
closer to evidence-based practice. First, the court requires the agency to
consider obvious alternatives (such that the agency is in fact exercising
discretion), and second, the court identifies decisions untethered to the
evidentiary record as arbitrary and capricious actions that exceed agency
authority. These tools are limited, of course, to the evidentiary record before
the court—where evidence is not introduced in the administrative record,
such as through notice-and-comment rulemaking, it would be more difficult
to courts to identify its absence, and to therefore fault agencies for lack of
consideration. But where evidence is available, judicial review may provide
some check on ratcheting. Judicial review may also police evidence
distortion, although to a lesser extent. Courts are perhaps poorly suited to
instruct agencies on how to weight the evidence that they review, and they
are at a disadvantage in instructing agencies about evidence missing from
the administrative record. But where there is a great disparity between the
evidence in the record and the decision reached, the ability of courts to
reverse actions that “run counter to the evidence” can be a tool (however
weak) against evidence distortion.274
Courts have less capacity to rein in the shortcomings of EBPM efforts by
legislatures. Assuming legislation does not implicate a fundamental right or
a suspect class, statutes are reviewed only for rational basis, under which
“legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification
272. Id.
273. Id., at 53.
274. Judicial review is likely to be less effective against terminal experimentation.
Terminal experimentation would likely be borne out in challenges based on
a failure to issue rules, which may only be actionable if it frustrates the
operation of a federal statute. The decision to refrain from rulemaking,
however (such as by by rejecting a party’s petition to issue rules), is “‘at the
high end of the range’ of levels of deference given to agency action,”
actionable only when the agency has failed to “adequate[ly] explain the facts
and policy concerns it relied on and . . . those facts have some basis in the
record.” See Preminger v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 632 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
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drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”275
Congress has a wide berth for error on this standard, by which it is
presumed that “even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by
the democratic processes.”276 Legislation that burdens fundamental rights
or a suspect class is reviewed based on whether it is “narrowly tailored” to
a compelling state interest, but courts do not scrutinize whether Congress
has chosen the option with the strongest evidence base. Without more tools,
the pathologies of evidence distortion, ratcheting, and terminal
experimentation are largely out of reach with respect to Congressional
decisions.
Beyond judicial review, agency watchdogs may also serve as checks on
irresponsible uses of evidence. The Government Accountability Office
(which provides feedback to Congress on federal expenditures) and the
Congressional Budget Office (which provides analyses of economic issues
including projections of the impacts of proposed legislation) might promote
more rigorous uses of empirical evidence by assessing the likely impact of
government-funded evaluation research, in light of research designs,
transparency of findings, and political environment for using research
findings. CBO already plays an important role in quantifying the likely
impacts of proposed legislation, which is central to EBPM efforts. The Office
of the Inspector General in each agency (which oversees agencies for fraud
and waste) might also broaden its consideration of possible evaluation
funds as “waste” when they are unlikely to lead to usable evidence.
CONCLUSION
Evidence-based policy is on the rise, and legislation and agency
regulation have been no exception to calls for greater uptake of research in
practice. Indeed, modern interests in moneyball and EBPM are part of a long
history of efforts to promote research-based decisions in government.
Where research is inconclusive, as in the case of the NRC death penalty
report, many are left feeling rudderless. But there are many reasons to be
skeptical of the capacity of EBPM in governmental decision-making. EBPM
is itself bounded by limits on rationality, the capacity of science, the
objectivity of science, and the authority we wish to give technocrats. Highly
values-driven decisions will be resistant to evidence-based reasoning and
are more likely to result in “sham” evidence-based practices, such as
evidence distortion, terminal experimentation, and ratcheting actions to
275. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
276. Id.
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sanction entire funding priorities rather than individual programs. Broken
experimentation is also common, with evaluations of government
programming and policies missing innumerable opportunities to provide
rigorous evidence.
This Article has considered the effects of broken experimentation and
sham EBPM, including potential harms to welfare, scientific legitimacy,
research subjects, and the production of research evidence, as well as
potential downstream benefits through collateral EBPM where evaluations
are reliable. Given the balance of harms and downstream benefits, I have
proposed a set of strategies to promote genuine EBPM (where possible) and
rigorous evaluations of policy choices. Some are more feasible, such as more
specific evaluation mandates, adversarial collaborations, or the prepublication of government-sponsored program and policy evaluations on a
repository such as clinicaltrials.gov. Some are less likely, such as precommitments to avoid ratcheting, to require disclosures in governmental
programs, or to support policy choices on the basis of impending
evaluations. Regardless, the current moment of interest in EBPM is
generally worth encouraging, whether by these means or other efforts to
promote the uptake of research evidence. Assuming that legislators and
agency personnel in fact wish to promote the good of the people, genuine
engagement with empirical evidence promises greater efficiency in
reaching those goals. These strategies may help avoid the pitfalls of poor
experimentation and sham EBPM, and where evidence-based practice is
feasible, they may help put research-based choices on more solid ground.
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